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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
I. 
Is the creation of the remedy of "equitable restitution" 
by the Court of Appeals in conflict with that Court's previous 
holdings that an advanced degree is not divisible marital 
property pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Anno. § 30-3-
5 (1987)? 
II. 
Does a trial court have the authority under Utah Code 
Ann. § 3 0-3-5 (1987) to allocate income tax exemptions in any 
manner that it deems fair and equitable in a divorce action? 
III. 
Was it an abuse of discretion for the Court of Appeals to 
modify the trial court's award of alimony and child support in 
light of the inadequacy of facts in the record and that 
court's creation of the remedy of equitable restitution? 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 
Martinez v. Martinez, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (April 26, 1988). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision being reviewed was filed by the Utah Court 
of Appeals on April 19, 1988. No Petitions for Rehearing have 
been filed or are pending. No extension of time has been 
granted in which to Petition for Writ of Certiorari. This 
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within 30 days of the 
filing of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-3(a) and § 78-2a-4 (1987). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987). 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). 
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987). 
Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. The parties were married for 
seventeen years and have three children. At the time the 
parties were married, each had a high school education. 
Thereafter, the husband graduated from medical school in 1981; 
the parties separated during the husband's internship, and at 
the time of the trial, the husband was completing his 
residency. During the course of the marriage, the wife worked 
outside the home for a total of three years as a part-time 
waitress. She earned a total of $2,779. 
The pertinent provisions of the trial court's ruling are 
as follows: 
1. The wife was awarded custody of the parties' 
three children subject to the husband's reasonable 
visitation rights. [Record at 213.] 
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2. The husband was ordered to pay $300 per month 
per child as child support (for a total of $900) with 
that support to continue until each child reached 21 
years subject to a $100 per month per child abatement 
should that child come to live with him. [Record at 
213. ] 
3. The husband was awarded the tax exemptions for 
the two older children and the wife received the 
youngest. [Record at 213-14.] 
4. The husband was ordered to pay to the wife $400 
per month alimony for five years, and the award would not 
terminate should she remarry in the first three years. 
[Record at 214.] 
5. The wife was awarded the marital residence 
subject to a lien in the husband's favor payable upon the 
occurrence of certain events, but not payable upon her 
remarriage. [Record at 214-15.] 
6. Each party was awarded the personal property in 
their respective possessions. [Record at 215.] 
7. Each party was ordered to pay the debts which 
they incurred after their separation and the husband was 
ordered to pay approximately $20,000 in student loans. 
[Record at 215-16.] 
8. The husband was ordered to pay his attorney's 
3 
fees and $2,500 to the wife for her attorneys fees and 
costs. [Record at 216.] 
The wife then appealed this decision to the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the case was argued before Judges Davidson, 
Billings and Jackson. The Court's opinion was written by 
Judge Davidson, concurred in by Judge Billings and dissented 
from by Judge Jackson. It affirmed in part, reversed in part 
and remanded. The majority ruled as follows: 
1. It found that the trial court's award of child 
support was an abuse of discretion, and then awarded $600 
per month per child as child support, (for a total of 
$1,800) to continue to age twenty-one if the child is 
full-time student and not married. 
2. It fourxi that the trial court's award of alimony 
was an abuse of discretion, and then awarded the 
plaintiff permanent alimony in the amount of $750 per 
month. 
3. In addition to the increased alimony, it held 
that the wife was entitled to an award of "equitable 
restitution" and remanded for determination of an 
appropriate amount. In determining the newly created 
concept of "equitable restitution," the Court stated: 
We use the term equitable restitution to 
describe the award in order to establish a 
clear distinction between it and 
traditional alimony or any other form of 
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spousal maintenance or support. The 
function of equitable restitution is to 
enable a spouse to share the newly 
obtained earning capacity of a former 
spouse who has achieved that capacity 
through the significant efforts and 
sacrifices of the requesting spouse which 
were detrimental to that spouse's 
development. It is nothing more than an 
equitable sharing of the rewards of both 
parties' common efforts and expectations. 
Martinez v. Martinez, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 41 (April 19, 
1988), (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
4. It also agreed with the appellant that the trial 
court did not have the authority to equitably distribute 
the state and federal tax exemptions for the parties' 
minor children as such distribution violated the 
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution in 
light of the 1984 Tax Reform Act and the provisions of 26 
U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988). Therefore, the Court held that 
under federal law the plaintiff was entitled to claim all 
of the exemptions. 
5. Finally, the Court found no abuse of discretion 
in the trial court's award of attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
When the parties were married on June 6, 1968, Mr. 
Martinez was an E-5 in the United States Army [Transcript at 
4.] and both parties only had a high school education. 
[Transcript at 6.] 
From 1968 to 1977, Mr. Martinez remained continually 
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employed and was the primary income producer while his wife 
only worked part-time for a total of three years between 1968 
and 1982, the date of the parties' separation. [Transcript at 
52-53.] 
The income of the parties, as presented at trial in Mrs. 
Martinez's Exhibit "A" is reflected as follows: 
FAMILY INCOME 
OTHER 
$ 30.36 
216.00 
OTHER 
64.00 
189.00 
185.00 
In 197 0, Mr. Martinez decided to attend college, and Mrs. 
Martinez reluctantly agreed. [Transcript at 13.] He applied 
to medical school, and he was accepted by the University of 
Utah School of Medicine in 1977. [Transcript at 7.] 
Mrs. Martinez was adamantly opposed to Mr. Martinez going 
to medical school, and that disagreement almost destroyed the 
marriage. [Transcript at 14, 31 and 33.] To support his 
family and pay for tuition and books during the four years of 
undergraduate school and the first year of medical school, Mr. 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
YEAR 
1981 
1982 
1983 
$10,840 
11,411 
13,324 
14,797 
15,968 
TOTAL 
$11,248 
26,990 
35,579 
$10,840 
11,381 
13,323 
14,464 
13,089 
MEDICAL SCHOOL 
HUSBAND 
$ 116 
2,663 
WIFE 
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Martinez worked and received benefits from his G.I. Bill. 
[Transcript at 35 and 53.] During this time, he purchased a 
home and built an equity which was used to purchase a second 
home, which was the residence awarded to the wife in the 
divorce action. [Transcript at 57.] In addition to these 
monies, he received $7,000 from his mother's estate and used 
that to pay family expenses. [Transcript at 53.] Mr. 
Martinez also took out three student loans, one of which was 
for $20,000 [Transcript at 54.] and all of which he is now 
repaying and for which Mrs. Martinez was not held responsible. 
[Record at 215.] 
During the entire marriage, Mrs. Martinez did not work 
except as a part-time waitress in 1978, 1979 and 1980. 
[Transcript at 35 and 53.] When she worked, Mr. Martinez 
stayed home and watched the three children. [Transcript at 3 0 
and 3 5.] 
After Mr. Martinez graduated from medical school in 1981, 
he secured an internship at Danville, Pennsylvania, 
[Transcript at 7] and although Mrs. Martinez was reluctant, 
the family moved to Pennsylvania with him. [Transcript at 16, 
52 and 55.] After six months, Mrs. Martinez returned to Utah 
because she was uncomfortable in the setting and missed her 
family and friends. [Transcript at 17.] Her dissatisfaction 
affected Dr. Martinez's work and internship and placed an 
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extreme amount of additional pressure on him. [Transcript at 
19.] 
At the time of trial in May 1985, Mrs. Martinez was 
working for Mountain Fuel and had just voluntarily gone to 
three-quarters time to get an education and spend more time 
with the children. [Transcript at 48 and 59.] Her net income 
was $846 per month [Transcript at 42] and Mountain Fuel was 
going to pay all of the costs of her education.. [Transcript 
at 48.] At trial, her monthly family expenses were $2,056. 
[Transcript at 43 and 58.] 
Also, at the time of trial, Dr. Martinez had completed 
one year of a two year residency as an emergency room 
physician in Pennsylvania. [Transcript at 3 and 100.] Under 
his two year contract, he earned $100,000 per year, or $8,333 
per month. His net income was $7,100 per month after the 
deduction of expenses such as malpractice insurance. 
[Transcript at 9-11 and 66.] He had to put one-half of his 
gross earnings in a tax account as he had no tax deductions or 
shelters. [Transcript at 102-03.] He was paying back his 
student loans and had expenses, including a $1,100 temporary 
support payment for a total of $4,337. [Exhibit 3.] His net 
monthly salary after taxes was $4,022. [Transcript at 102.J 
There was no evidence in the record to establish his 
employment plans or potential income after his contract ended 
8 
in 1986. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION CREATING THE 
REMEDY OF EQUITABLE RESTITUTION IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH AND IS A DRASTIC 
DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THAT 
COURT ON AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE 
LAW, 
In Martinez v. Martinez, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (April 26, 
1988) , the Court of Appeals created a new remedy called 
"equitable restitution." Under Martinez, an award of this 
type is now to be considered in divorce cases where one spouse 
has obtained a professional degree during the marriage, and 
the divorce occurs as that spouse begins his/her new career 
and is on the threshold of increased earning capacity. The 
court expressly distinguished this new remedy from all other 
forms of spousal maintenance or support and stated that, 
"'[equitable restitution]' is nothing more than an equitable 
sharing of the reward of both parties' common efforts and 
expectations." Id. at 41. An award of equitable restitution 
evidently will not terminate upon remarriage and may be 
payable in a lump sum or periodically over time. In addition 
to remanding the Martinez case for determination of the amount 
of equitable restitution to be awarded her, the court also 
awarded Mrs. Martinez permanent alimony in the amount of $750 
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per month based upon Dr. Martinez's increased Scilary. 
The practical and realistic effect of this decision is in 
conflict with previous rulings by other panels of the Court of 
Appeals and the dictum of the Utah Supreme Court. The basic 
issue is whether an advanced degree is marital property 
subject to division upon divorce. It was first addressed by 
the Court of Appeals in Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 
(Utah App. 1987) . In Petersen, the trial court had awarded 
$1,000 per month alimony, $300 per month per child as child 
support for a total of $1,800, and a $120,000 cash settlement 
as a property award representing Mrs. Petersen's interest in 
her husband's medical degree. The Court of Appeals panel 
consisting of Judge Orme, Bench and Jackson unanimously 
decided that "an advanced degree is or confers an intangible 
right which, because of its character, cannot properly be 
characterized as property subject to division between the 
spouses." Id. at 241. The Court went on to conclude that 
"[i]n this State, traditional alimony analysis is the 
appropriate and adequate method for making adjustments between 
the parties in cases of this type." Id. at 242. 
Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals followed and 
reemphasized the principle of Petersen in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 
738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987). The Rayburn court, again made 
up of Judges Orme, Bench and Jackson, stated: 
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Recently this court held that an advanced 
degree or professional licence is not 
marital property subject to division upon 
divorce. However, an advanced degree 
often accompanies a disparity in earning 
potential that is appropriately considered 
as a factor in alimony analysis. We 
affirm our holding in Petersen and analyze 
the instant appeal under the same analysis 
applied in that case. 
Id. at 240 (citations omitted). 
Finally, although it did not have to decide the issue, 
the Utah Supreme Court addressed case law from other states 
pertaining to the division of degrees as "property" upon 
divorce in the case of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 
1988) . After stating that, in order to do equity in some 
factual instances, a court may have to compensate a spouse 
based on other legal and equitable principles, this Court 
concluded that, "we agree that an educational or professional 
degree is difficult to value and that such evaluation does not 
easily fit the common understanding of the character of 
property." Id. at 1081. 
The practical effect of the new concept created in 
Martinez is wholely inconsistent with the law as set out in 
Petersen. Rayburn and Gardner. Martinez begins by awarding 
Mrs. Martinez an increased amount of permanent alimony based 
upon Dr. Martinez's increased earning capacity. It then also 
awarded her an amount of "equitable restitution," a remedy 
expressly distinguished from traditional alimony or other 
11 
spousal support and based on the increased earning capacity of 
a spouse as a result of that spouse's professional degree. 
Therefore, regardless of its facial characterization, an award 
of equitable restitution is an award of an interest in a 
marital asset. 
Judge Jackson, who concurred in both the Petersen and 
Rayburn cases, summed up the inequities and improprieties of 
the Martinez decision in his well reasoned dissent. He 
pointed out that Mrs. Martinez did not provide the financial 
capital necessary for her husband to obtain his medical degree 
and that here was no evidence that she deferred her own 
educational or career plans in order to advance her husband's. 
He also noted that the parties had accumulated sufficient real 
and personal property from which an appropriate award could 
be fashioned. He went on to say: 
On the facts presented in this case, there 
are additional reasons why I believe the 
majority's disposition of this appeal is 
misguided: (1) equity can be achieved 
under current alimony and property 
distribution statutes and case law; (2) an 
award of equitable restitution coupled 
with the majority's generous alimony and 
child support awards is double-dipping; 
and (3) an award of equitable 
restitution, in effect, treats the 
professional education as "propeirty" 
subject to division upon dissolution of a 
marriage. 
After outlining his position, Judge Jackson concluded: 
Provision for Mrs. Martinez's needs is 
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best dealt with through a generous but 
fair distribution of property and award of 
alimony, not through the creation of a 
distinctly new form of cleverly disguised 
marital property for which there is no 
precedent. (footnotes omitted) 
As a result, the Martinez decision is in conflict with 
previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and this Court on 
an important question of state law. It represents a drastic 
departure from this law. It also represents a theory never 
raised by appellant in the Courts below. Therefore, 
certiorari should issue to review its creation and application 
to Petitioner. 
II. 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE 
THE HOLDING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT A 
TRIAL COURT CANNOT EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTE 
TAX EXEMPTIONS IN A DIVORCE ACTION IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH UTAH CODE ANN. S 30-3-5 AND 
DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
On appeal, Mrs. Martinez argued that the supremacy clause 
of the United States Constitution, in light of the 1984 Tax 
Reform Act and its effect on 26 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. 1988), 
prevents a state court from allocating tax exemptions between 
the parties to a divorce action. She argued that the statute 
requires the trial court to award her all three exemptions 
and that the only exception is where the custodial parent 
signs a written declaration agreeing to not claim the children 
for a tax year in question. Because she did not sign such a 
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written declaration, she claimed that the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding two exemptions to Dr. Martinez 
because the issue was preempted by the federal law under the 
provisions of the supremacy clause. 
The Court of Appeals agreed and discussed whether Mrs. 
Martinez's amended complaint in 1985 preempted an earlier 
settlement agreement wherein she agreed that Mr. Martinez 
could claim the tax deductions. The court concluded that the 
complaint did in fact preempt the settlement agreement, and 
since there was no other valid agreement, Dr. Martinez did not 
fit within the only exception outlined under federal law. 
Therefore, Mrs. Martinez was awarded the tax exemptions for 
all three children. This holding is in conflict with Utah 
law, and is not supported by the language in § 152. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987), grants great discretion 
to the trial court in divorce matters. It states, "When a 
decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property and 
parties." The case law interpreting this section is equally 
broad. In Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978), this 
Court stated: 
In the distribution of the marital estate, 
there is no fixed rule or formula. The 
statutory standard is established in 
Section 30-3-5, the court may make such 
orders in relation to the parties as may 
be equitable. The responsibility of the 
14 
trial court is to endeavor to provide a 
just and equitable adjustment of their 
economic resources so that the parties 
might reconstruct their lives on a happy 
and useful basis. 
Id. at 148. (See also. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1980).) 
In the past, the Utah Supreme Court has held that this 
authority allows a trial court to determine which party is 
entitled to the tax exemptions for the parties' minor 
children. In Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) 
the appellant argued that the trial court erred in awarding 
the tax exemption to the wife because in her complaint she had 
asked the award to be given to him. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that the entitlement to the tax deduction became a matter 
of dispute between the parties at trial, and it was proper for 
the trial court to consider the issue. The Newmeyer case 
stands for the proposition that the trial court has the 
authority to equitably award and distribute tax exemptions 
between the parties to a divorce action. 
In addition, 26 U.S.C. § 152 does not limit this broad 
authority of the trial court. This section is included in 
the appendix to this Petition. It simply requires that a 
custodial parent sign a written declaration stating he or she 
will not claim the child as a dependent and then the 
noncustodial parent must attach this to his or her return. 
The federal law does not prohibit a state court from 
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determining an equitable distribution of tax exemptions and 
ordering a custodial spouse to execute the required form. 
Therefore, the Martinez decision on tax exemptions is 
inconsistent with Utah law. Because the holding is a drastic 
departure from established law on an important issue of state 
and federal law, certiorari should be granted as to this issue 
also. 
III. 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' MODIFICATION OF 
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH ACCEPTED APPELLATE 
PRACTICES AND PREVIOUS RULINGS OF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT. 
In Martinez, the trial court awarded Mrs. Martinez 
alimony in the amount of $400 per month for five years and the 
award was made non-terminable should she remarry in the first 
three years. It also ordered Dr. Martinez to pay child 
support of $300 per child per month for a total of $900 until 
each child reached 21 years. 
The Martinez case held that these awards were too low and 
constituted an abuse of discretion. However, instead of 
remanding this issue, the Court of Appeals modified the child 
support award to $600 per month per child for a total of 
$1,800 per month and awarded Mrs. Martinez permanent alimony 
of $750 per month. As the dissent of Judge Jackson correctly 
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points out, there was insufficient evidence in the record to 
enable the Court of Appeals to properly make these 
modifications and that the proper forum to make any 
adjustments would be the trial court. 
Therefore, this decision is inconsistent with the law and 
standard judicial practices. It is a well accepted tenent of 
appellate review that an appellate court cannot consider 
matters not in the record before it. This Court, in Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 14 
Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963), stated "Under simple 
principles of appellate review, we cannot consider matters not 
on the record before the trial court, absence of which was 
made apparent on examination of the record filed with this 
Court." Id. 
In Martinez, the Court of Appeals did not follow these 
principles of appellate review. First, the court modified the 
support awards based on Dr. Martinez's gross income under a 
two year contract of which he had already worked one year at 
the time of trial and which had expired 2 years before the 
Martinez opinion. At the time of trial, Dr. Martinez had not 
yet been board certified, and there was no evidence presented 
as to his future employment or potential income after he 
completed his residency in 1986. In addition, as outlined by 
the dissent, the only evidence as to need was Mrs. Martinez's 
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estimate of hers and the childrens' expenses. The majority 
disregarded this figure as too low and made what the dissent 
termed as an "independent estimate" of need. (80 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 44) . The lack of necessary evidence should have led 
the court to remand the case for a determination of need and 
Dr. Martinez's ability to pay after reviewing all of the 
parties' circumstances. 
The error as to the alimony and child support 
modification is even more serious in light of the court's 
remand to determine a further award of "equitable 
restitution." Consequently, the discretion of trial court 
will be severely restricted because the appellate court has 
locked in the alimony and child support awards. As correctly 
stated by Judge Jackson in his dissent, "This action deprives 
the trial court, on remand, of any flexibility to adjust the 
debts, property, alimony and support awards and to fashion an 
overall award package that harmonizes all the variables. The 
trial court's discretion will be so restricted that an 
equitable outcome will be impossible." Id. at 44. 
Thus, the unilateral fixing of increased amounts of child 
support and alimony is contrary to the law of this Court and 
accepted judicial practices. Certiorari should issue to 
review the decision by the Court of Appeals and correct the 
errors committed by that Court. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law: (1) a professional degree is not 
considered a marital asset subject to division in a divorce 
action; (2) a trial court has broad discretionary authority to 
enter orders to achieve equity in a divorce action, including 
but not limited to making orders for the distribution of tax 
exemptions for minor children; and (3) an appellate court 
cannot render a decision based on matters or evidence not in 
the record. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Martinez v. 
Martinez, supra, is contrary to these principles. An award of 
"equitable restitution" is, for all practical purposes, the 
same as treating a professional degree as a marital asset 
subject to division upon divorce. This is especially true in 
the Martinez case when the Court of Appeals directed that 
"equitable restitution" be made and also increased the alimony 
award based on Mr. Martinez's increased income as a result of 
his degree. Second, in awarding Mrs. Martinez the three tax 
exemptions, the holding in Martinez strips Utah trial courts 
of any authority to consider tax exemptions as a part of the 
overall financial package that must be created for the 
parties in a divorce action. Finally, the Court of Appeals 
unilaterally modified the trial court's child support and 
alimony awards without sufficient evidence before it to do so. 
19 
The holdings in Martinez are in conflict with and 
represent a drastic departure from Utah statutory law and case 
law as established by this Court and the Court of Appeals. 
Because the issues are important questions of state law and 
serious and substantial inequities have occurred, a Writ of 
Certiorari should issue. 
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3 (1984). See Heltman v Heltman, 29 Utah 2d 
444, 5! l P . 2 d 720(1973) 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
! Although the court's order with respect to the 
adult child was only "temporary" until the court 
received an evaluation of her condition by Davis 
County Mental Health, the record contains no such 
report or any ruling or further order of the court 
modifying or terminating this provision of the 
decree, which neither party has objected to on 
appeal 
2 The decree attributes present and future work and 
income to Mrs Rasband with which she is expected 
to provide ongoing support for herself and her adult 
daughter The court, however, made no specific 
earning capacity finding, I e , a dollar amount the 
trial court believes she is capable of earning 
monthly She needs such a "baseline" in order to 
seek a modification of alimony in the future by 
showing a substantial change in circumstances if, in 
fact, she does not or cannot obtain work providing 
that level of income See Higlcy v Higley, 676 P 2d 
379, 382 n 1 (Utah 1983) On the other hand, 
without such a specific finding, any income she does 
earn from employment will show improved circum 
stances on her part, supporting a request by respo-
ndent to lower his alimony obligation She should 
not be thus penalized, at least until her earnings 
exceed the baseline amount the trial court contem-
plated she could and would make when the decree 
was entered See Canning v Canning, /44 P 2d 325, 
327 (Utah App 1987) 
It is obvious that many circumstances of the 
parties could change materially in eight years or less 
Accordingly, we think decreasing alimony-based 
on speculation about a future ability to earn-is 
generally inappropriate in view of the court's cont-
inuing jurisdiction to modify an original decree 
under Utah Code Ann §30-3 5(1987) 
3 Even if she secured full time employment at the 
federal minimum wage Mrs Rasband would only 
earn a gross income of SI34 per week, approxima 
tely $536 per month After taxes are taken out, 
these earnings plus the alimony awarded by the trial 
court do not even meet her basic monthly needs of 
$1,250-$ 1,400 
4 See Higlcy, 676 P 2d at 382 
On remand, the trial court must cons-
ider whether the appellant has the ability 
to earn enough to supplement the per-
manent alimony award to a level consi 
stent with the guidelines s«t forth by this 
Court for determining a reasonable 
alimony award If the trial court finds 
that the appellant does not have this 
ability, then it should modify its award 
of permanent alimony accordingly If 
the trial court believes that the appellant 
does have this abihtv, then it should 
make such a finding of fact Absent a I 
finding regarding the appellant's ability 
to work, the appellant would be precl-
uded in the future from asking the court 
to modify her alimony award based on 
changed circumstances if she can show 
in the future nhat she is unable to work 
enl 
5 Appellant's counsel advised the trial 
court that hr$ assistant was present at 
trial to help him with witness and 
exhibit management The court advised 
counsel that it did not intend to allow 
him to receive credit for that work, since 
that was precisely the bailiffs job 
There is nothing in the record to suggest 
that the court categorically refused to 
consider the pre-trial work performed 
by the legal assistant in determining the 
reasonable atitorney fee in this case 
Because of this, we need not reach the 
issue of whether a trial court must take 
into account the time expended by 
counsel's legal assistant in determining a 
reasonable attorney fee 
Cite as 
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OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s f rom "a d ec r ee of 
divorce entered by the Second District 
Cour t We affirm in par t , reverse in 
part, and remand 
FACTS 
The parties were married on June 22, 1968, 
subsequently, three children were born At the 
time of marriage, both plaintiff and defendant 
were high school graduates and defendant 
was serving as an enlisted man in the U S 
Army After defendant's discharge from the 
s e r v i c e , h e a c c e p t e d e m p l o y m e n t 
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at Hill Air Force Base, Utah where 
he worked as an instrument repair 
mechanic with an annual gross 
salary of approximately $10,000 00 
Defendant began his higher educa-
tion in 1970 Defendant testified the 
parties discussed his pursuit of a 
degree and that plaintiff thought it 
was a "good idea" but that she 
"wasn*t terribly in favor of it" 
because it would be time consu-
ming Plaintiff testified she was in 
favor of the decision because the 
family would "have a better 
future " Defendant completed his 
undergraduate program five and 
one-half years later During this 
phase of his education, defendant 
supported the family on his wages 
and G I Bill benefits Plaintiff gave 
birth to children in 1970, 1971, and 
1975 
While an undergraduate, defendant decided 
to apply to medical school The parties agree 
that defendant's application to medical school 
threatened their marriage Plaintiff was con 
cerned that defendant's lack of employment 
during four years would be financially detn 
mental to the family and that medical school 
would severely limit defendant's ability to 
"spend much time" with the children and 
plaintiff Seeing that defendant was adamant, 
plaintiff agreed to "stick by him" during the 
next four years believing that, as a result of 
their mutual sacrifices, the family would eve 
ntually enjoy a higher standard of living 
Defendant entered medical school in 1977 
and graduated in 1981 Family support was 
derived from student loans, savings, the rem 
ainder of defendant's G I Bill entitlement, 
$7,000 00 from defendant's mother's estate, 
and income from plaintiffs part time emp 
loyment 
Upon completion of medical school, defe-
ndant accepted an internship in Pennsylvania 
Plaintiff reluctantly left Utah The family's 
first residence in Pennsylvania was in an isol 
ated location with no telephone and no play 
mates for the children The family then rented 
a home in a larger town and plaintiff sought 
employment to supplement defendant's salary 
as an intern Plaintiff testified that she found 
a position at a fast food restaurant but defe 
ndant did not want her to work there because 
it would be embarrassing Because of the fn 
ction between the parties and defendant's 
admitted relationship with another woman, 
plaintiff requested they seek marital counseling 
but defendant refused Because of plaintiff's 
lack of prospects for suitable employment in 
Pennsylvania and the marital discord, plaintiff 
and the children returned to the family home 
in Utah to wait for defendant to finish his 
medical training Although plaintiff unders 
tood defendant intended to practice medicine 
v. Martinez COOE«CO 
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in Utah, defendant completed his training and 
accepted employment in Pennsylvania 
Plaintiff filed a verified complaint for 
divorce on February 15, 1983 In a stipulation 
and separation agreement, signed by the 
parties and filed with the court on July 29, 
1983, plaintiff agreed defendant could claim 
federal tax exemptions for two of the children 
while she retained the exemption for the third 
child The settlement agreement also recogn-
ized the need to "make appropriate adjustm-
ents" in the support agreement in the event of 
future changes in financial circumstances 
After plaintiff hired new counsel, she filed a 
verified amended complaint in November 
1983, in which the distribution of the tax 
exemptions remained the same On May 9, 
I 1985, however, plaintiff filed a motion for 
I leave to amend the complaint which was sub-
sequently granted This amendment listed 
defendant's salary as $100,000 00 per annum 
and requested that the child support and 
alimony awards reflect the significant increase 
in defendant's income Plaintiff requested 
attorney fees and costs which would reflect the 
current state of the litigation as opposed to 
that anticipated in 1983 Plaintiff also reque 
sted the trial court to strike the previously 
proposed distribution of federal tax exempt 
ions for the children 
Trial to the court was held on May 31, 
1985 The decree of divorce awarded custody 
of the children to plaintiff subject to reason 
able visitation Plaintiff received $300 00 per 
month per child in child support subject to an 
abatement of $100 00 per month per child in 
the event that a child should live with defen 
dant for an extended period The distribution 
of tax exemptions was as initially agreed in the 
stipulation and separation settlement Alimony 
was awarded in the amount of $400 00 per 
month for a period of five years being nont 
erminable for a period of three years even if 
plaintiff remarried Plaintiff was awarded 
attorney fees in the amount of $2,500 00 
Plaintiff was also awarded the home subject to 
a mortgage and an equitable lien in favor of 
defendant for the sum of $17,528 00 payable 
upon the occurrence of enumerated, future 
contingencies The award of the home to 
plaintiff necessitated that she continue to 
make monthly mortgage payments of $309 00 
Plaintiff presents the following issues for 
review (1) did the award to defendant of the 
two tax exemptions violate federal law, (2) 
were the awards of attorney fees, child 
support, and alimony so inadequate as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion, and (3) is 
defendant's medical degree marital property 
subject to division9 
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME TAX 
EXEMPTIONS 
Plaintiff contends the distribution of state 
and federal income tax exemptions for two of 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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the children to defendant violates the Supre- I 
macy Clause of the U. S Constitution in light 
of the 1984 Tax Reform Act and its effect on 
26U.SC.§l52(e)(1988) « 
Subsection 152(e)(1) describes the normal 
situation where a custodial parent claims the 
tax exemption for a child An exception is 
provided in subsection 152(e)(4)(A). The 
noncustodial parent may claim the exemption j 
when there is a qualified pie-1985 instrument 
between the parents which states that the | 
noncustodial parent shall be entitled to the j 
exemption for the child and that parent pro- j 
vides at least $600 00 yearly for the child's I 
support The definition of a qualified pre-
1985 instrument is stated in subsection 
152(e)(4)(B) as. 
For purposes of this paragraph, the 
term "qualified pre-1985 instru-
ment" means any decree of divorce 
or separate maintenance or written 
agreement — 
(l) which is executed before January 
1,1985, 
(u) which on such date contains the 
provision described in subparagraph 
(A)(i), and 
(in) which is not modified on or 
after such date in a modification 
which expressly provides that this 
paragraph snail not apply to such i 
decree or agreement 
The parties stipulated to the distribution of 
the tax exemptions for the children in a sepa-
ration agreement filed with the court in 1983 
The distribution was incorporated in the ver-
ified amended complaint also filed that year 
Subparagraphs (I) and (u) of subsection 
152(e)(4)(B) are satisfied by the 1983 filings 
There was no written modification prior to 
January 1, 1985, which expressly revoked the 
distribution of tax exemptions during the 
period the stipulation and separation agree-
ment was in effect Therefore, defendant was 
entitled to the two exemptions as stipulated 
prior to the entry of the decree of divorce 
However, plaintiffs amended complaint in 
1985 put the distribution of tax exemptions at 
issue in the divorce proceeding The provisions 
of the separation agreement were no longer 
effective Plaintiff requested the tax exempt-
ions for all three children but the trial court's 
order did not honor that request This result is 
contrary to the general provisions of section 
152(e) Any argument that the stipulation and 
separation agreement qualifies as a pre-1985 
instrument, where plaintiff willingly relinqui-
shes her right to the exemptions under federal 
law, neglects plaintiffs rejection of its terms 
in the post-divorce period By amending her 
complaint, plaintiff modified and affirmatively 
rejected the pre divorce distribution Plaintiff 
is entitled to the tax exemptions for all of the 
children in view of the award of custody to 
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her and the failure of defendant to establish 
any exception to the general rule stated above. 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees of only 
$2,500 00 when she asked for $7,871.00. Pla-
intiff clearly demonstrated a need for assist-
ance. The court recognized that need by 
making the award However, the court consi-
dered a written statement of attorney fees as a 
basis for the award Extensive fees were gen-
erated by tmerest and preparation of the 
expert testimony offered to support the valu-
ation of the medical degree. That argument 
was rejected by the lower court. We find no 
abuse of discretion in the award. 
Because defendant did not cross appeal on 
this issue, we do not consider whether there 
was sufficient evidence presented to the trial 
court to justify any award of attorney fees 
Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P 2d 1276 (Utah 
1987) 
AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT 
Utah Code Ann §§78-45-3,-4 (1987) 
establish the obligation of both parents to 
support their children and "la] child's right to 
that support is paramount " Woodward v 
Woodward, 709 P 2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court continued "The trial 
I court may fashion such equitable orders in 
relation to the children and their support as is 
reasonable and necessary, considering not only 
the needs of the children, but also the ability 
of the parent to pay " Id Plaintiff contends 
the award of $300 00 per month per child was 
so inordinately low that it constituted an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court We agree 
The trial court found defendant's gross 
income was $100,000 00 per annum or 
$8,333 00 per month, at the time of the 
divorce, while it determined plaintiffs gross 
income was $1,033 00 per month 2 The court 
found that plaintiff had monthly expenditures 
of $2,050 00 and was in need of financial 
assistance from delendant to assist the chil-
dren "in maintaining a standard of living more 
comparable to that enjoyed by their father " 
Assuming the three children spend the 
majority of the year with plaintiff, her gross 
monthly income, including awarded child 
support and alimony, is $2,333 00 After taxes 
have been deducted from the portions of 
income subject to taxation, plaintiffs net 
monthlv income approximates her meager 
monthly expenses leaving no leeway for eme-
rgencies, presently necessary replacement 
expenditures, or any amenities of life Under 
such grim economic reality, the children who 
reside with their mother will not enjoy a sta-
ndard of living remotely comparable to that of 
their father 
The award established by the trial court 
cannot be justified when applying the factors 
REPORTS UTAH ADVAfv 
listed in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) 
(1987).* We find plaintiff and her children are 
left in a precariously balanced financial exist-
ence while defendant is relatively affluent. 
Plaintiff and the children are in great need of 
assistance. The defendant has no responsibility 
for the support of anyone other than plaintiff, 
the children, and himself. 
At the present time the courts of this state 
do not have uniform guidelines to employ in 
determining an award of child support.4 Many 
other jurisdictions, however, have established 
child support guidelines or schedules, based 
upon current economic data as to the cost of 
rearing children, to be used by trial courts. 
Although we do not use the numbers or app-
roaches in fashioning the award in this case, a 
general comparison illustrates the inadequacy 
of the award. Because these formulas are 
based upon adjusted incomes, we cannot dir-
ectly compare the numbers. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that under each, the support would be 
much higher. For example, in Colorado, an 
income shares guideline state, the award would 
be approximately $1,535.00. Under Wisco-
nsin's Child Support Guidelines, which were 
recently adopted by our neighboring states of 
Idaho and Nevada, where only the noncusto-
dial parent's income is considered and where 
29% of gross income is the presumptive 
award, the child support for the three children 
would be $2,320.00. 
Under the economic circumstances of this 
case, the award of child support is inequitable 
and must be modified. The dissent argues the 
case must be remanded to determine the chil-
dren's need and the ability of each party to 
pay child support. We note the findings of 
fact do not fully address the child support 
factors. However, we believe this not to be 
reversible error because the totality of the 
factual evidence in the record is "clear, unco-
ntroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment" of the need 
for child support. Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987); Marchant v. Marchant, 
743 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah App. 1987). The 
record is also replete with the financial needs 
of the children and the relative abilities of 
plaintiff and defendant to meet those needs. 
Nothing could be gained by a remand for this 
purpose except a delay of the increased award, j 
Based upon the above reasoning, we award the 
sum of $600.00 per month per child, support 
to continue to age 21 if the child is a full time 
student and not married.5 On remand, the trial 
court shall enter its order for child support in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
5.1(1987). 
AWARD OF ALIMONY 
The standard of review relating to alimony 
requires that we not disturb the trial court's 
award unless "such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discr-
. Martinez CODE^ CO 
dv. Rep. 35 Provo, Uuh 
I etion." English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 
(Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court in that 
often quoted case states that "the most imp-
ortant function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as possible at 
the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage, and to prevent the wife from beco-
ming a public charge." Id. at 411. The Court 
continued that a trial court should consider 
"the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife, the ability of the wife to produce a suf-
ficient income for herself; and the ability of 
the husband to provide support." Id, at 411-
12. 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985), the Court conducted an extensive ana-
lysis of these three factors. Although the trial 
judge carefully considered the factors outlined 
in Jones, because plaintiff and the children 
were living in an artificially depressed standard 
of living, the award of only $400.00 per 
month of terminable alimony is inadequate. 
! We refuse to penalize plaintiff for trying to 
live within her means and failing to show 
higher necessary expenses.* 
An application of one of the English stan-
dards could justify the award made in this 
case. Plaintiff endured a poor standard of 
living during the marriage. She had little 
money to spend then so she should have little 
now. That result will preserve "the standard of 
living she enjoyed during marriage." But such 
a result is unfair. A divorce court is a court of 
equity. It is not equitable to preserve the 
status of limited income for one party and 
affluence for the other when the one sacrificed 
to help the other achieve such affluence. When 
the totality of the English standards are 
applied the award is clearly inadequate. 
The court below also abused its discretion in 
limiting the award of alimony to a period of 
five years; being nonterminable by reason of 
remarriage for three years. In Olson v. Olson, 
704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court analyzed a similar fact situation wherein 
the plaintiff wife was a high school graduate 
and had spent the majority of the marriage 
bearing and rearing the parties' six children. 
Defendant husband was a well paid consultant 
who provided his services to governmental 
agencies on a contract basis. While affirming 
the award of alimony in the amount of 
$1,600.00 per month, the Court modified the 
award by striking its two-year limitation and 
making the alimony permanent subject to 
future changed circumstances. In support of 
its modification, the Court pointed to the 
wife's limited education, her lack of work 
experience, and that she had "no reasonable 
expectation of obtaining employment two 
years hence that will enable her to support 
herself at a standard of living even approac-
hing that which she had during the marriage." 
Id. at 567. See also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 
96, 103 (Utah 1986). 
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For the reasons stated previously and based 
upon the facts in the record, we hold that 
plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony on 
a continuing basis and we award permanent 
alimony in the sum of $750.00 per month 
subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5(1987). 
THE MEDICAL DEGREE AND AWARD 
OF EQUITABLE RESTITUTION 
We next must determine whether defen-
dant's medical degree is marital property 
subject to division. In the recent case of Gardner 
v. Gardner, 748 P .2d 1076 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court discussed this 
problem and noted that there is authority 
from other jurisdictions on both sides of the 
issue. However, this Court, in Petersen v. 
Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 239-42 (Utah App. 
1987) and Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 
240 (Utah App. 1987), analyzed the issue and 
held that a medical degree is not marital pro-
perty subject to division in a divorce decree. 
We agree with the Utah Supreme Court "that 
an educational or professional degree is diffi-
cult to value and that such a valuation does 
not easily fit the common understanding of 
the character of property." Gardner, 748 P.2d 
at 1081. The Court in Gardner was not requ-
ired to address the issue because there was 
significant other property accumulated during 
the marriage resulting from the increased 
earning capacity afforded by the medical 
degree and the numerous years the Gardners 
enjoyed the standard of living afforded by the 
medical degree. That is not the case here. The 
Court noted, "The cases which have refused to 
hold that professional degrees and practice 
constitute marital property subject to valua-
tion and distribution have nonetheless assessed 
and divided the value of the degree or practice 
on the basis of other legal and equitable 
remedies." Id. at 1080-81. The Court descr-
ibed the common fact pattern applicable to 
this acknowledgment of the degree's equitable 
worth as a situation where "the husband is 
supported throughout a long graduate or 
professional program by the working wife, 
and the couple is divorced soon after gradua-
tion. In such cases, there are few marital 
assets to distribute, and the courts have con-
sidered other ways of compensating the 
spouse." Id. at 1081. This is essentially the 
situation presented here. While this marriage 
has continued for many years the only assets 
are the home and the enhanced earning capa-
city of defendant. The earning capacity must 
be recognized in fashioning those "legal and 
equitable remedies" necessary to assist plaintiff 
to readjust her life. The valuation and distri-
bution of the medical degree in this case is not 
a viable alternative. Valuation would be spe-
culative in the extreme, and distribution 
ignores the fact that the degree is personal to 
defendant.7 We prefer to follow the majority 
rule, upheld in Petersen and Rayburn, that a 
medical degree is not subject to valuation and 
distribution in a divorce. However, this case is 
a striking example of a highly paid professi-
onal disposing of his wife with a minimum 
amount of support just as that professional is 
reaching a level of income for which both the 
professional and his wife have striven. This 
prevents the wife from enjoying the benefit of 
her labor and sacrifice in support of her 
husband's goals. See generally L. Wcitzman, 
The Divorce Revolution, ch. 5, 124-35 
(1985). 
From the time of the marriage in 1968 until 
their separation in 1982, the parties enjoyed 
few of the material pleasures of life. The court 
found that "During the 14 years that the 
parties lived together, plaintiff assisted exten-
sively in Defendant's obtaining a college 
education, medical degree and internship. In 
addition, plaintiff made substantial sacrifices 
in order to facilitate the completion of Defe-
ndant's medical schooling and internship."1 
Plaintiff accepted the sacrifices necessary to 
support defendant's aspirations in anticipation 
of future benefits. The trial record shows the 
following exchange: 
Q. Okay. Was there any discussion 
of future benefits that would be 
obtained through this? 
A. Yes. He (defendant] told me that 
if I would sacrifice, and if I would 
see it through, that someday he 
would make it up to me and we 
would have material items that we 
had gone without. And his hours 
would be flexible and he would 
have more time to spend with 
himself and the children. If we 
would just be patient. 
Defendant offered no rebuttal to the exch-
ange. 
This Court in Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242, 
foresaw the situation now at issue. Writing for 
the Court, Judge Orme recognized that an 
occasion might arise whereby one spouse was 
reaching a high level of income just at the 
time of divorce rather than the more frequent 
situation in which the parties had enjoyed the 
benefits of the husband's medical education 
for a number of years. Judge Orme wrote: 
In cases like the instant one, life 
patterns have largely been set, the 
earning potential of both parties 
can be predicted with some reliabi-
lity, and the contributions and 
sacrifices of the one spouse in ena-
bling the other to attain a degree 
have been compensated by many 
years of the comfortable lifestyle 
which the degree permitted. Tradi-
tional alimony analysis works nicely 
to assure equity in such cases. 
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In another kind of recurring case, 
typified by Graham [In re Marriage 
of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 
P.2d 75 (1978)], where divorce 
occurs shortly after the degree is 
obtained, traditional alimony anal-
ysis would often work hardship 
because, while both spouses have 
modest incomes at the time of 
d ivorce , the one is on the 
[threshold] of a significant increase 
in earnings. Moreover, the spouse 
who sacrificed so the other could 
attain a degree is precluded from 
enjoying the anticipated dividends 
the degree will ordinarily provide 
.... In such cases, alimony analysis 
must become more creative to 
achieve fairness, and an award of 
"rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" 
alimony, not terminable upon 
remarriage, may be appropriate. See, 
e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 
Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 
(1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 
NJ. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). 
Id. at n.4. This is the situation where our 
analysis "must become more creative to 
achieve fairness." Id Equity demands a rec-
ognition of the sacrifices and contributions 
made by plaintiff in support of defendant's 
medical education. The defendant has been 
enriched by plaintiffs efforts and, therefore, 
plaintiff has earned an award of some perm-
anent financial benefit, in her own right, that 
will allow her to share in the economic bene-
fits achieved through their joint efforts. The 
modified award of traditional alimony merely 
maintains plaintiff on a plane modestly above 
that experienced by the parties during the 
marriage. Even this modest award may be lost 
through the happening of some future circu-
mstance.9 The dissent would restrict plaintiff 
to an award of traditional alimony based upon 
defendant's newly acquired level of income. 
Because there has been little property accum-
ulated and because the income was acquired 
after separation, plaintiff is entitled to a more 
permanent remedy. 
This issue has engendered much case law. 
Many courts have held that a professional 
degree is not marital property subject to dist-
ribution but nevertheless believe some remedy 
must be created for the spouse who supported 
the attainment of that degree. A threshold 
factor is the meaning of "support" when the 
term is applied to the efforts of the non-
professional spouse. Must "support" equate to 
direct financial assistance provided through 
full time employment while the student spouse 
devotes his or her full time efforts to course 
work? Is "support" rendered by a spouse 
whose full time activities are devoted to pro-
viding a home environment for the student 
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spouse and family? Here, plaintiff bore the 
children, was the principal in providing child 
care and maintaining the domestic setting, and 
was also employed part-time for several years 
while defendant attended medical school. To 
hold that plaintiffs only value is the income 
she generates ignores the value of her contri-
butions in every other aspect of family life. 
The logical conclusion is that motherhood and 
nurturing of children is valueless; that prese-
rving and maintaining a home is worthless; 
that the functions of mother, homemaker, and 
helpmate contribute nothing of value to a 
family. We refuse to so limit our definition of 
support. Certainly, our Supreme Court in 
analyzing traditional property distributions has 
never limited a wife to recovering only what 
I she monetarily contributed to the marriage. 
Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986). We 
hold in accordance with the court's finding 
that plaintiff contributed to and supported 
defendant's educational achievements. 
The case law remedies in this situation est-
ablish a spectrum, from those narrowly focu-
sing on financial support provided to the 
professional spouse, while he or she was a 
student, to those which consider the totality of 
the non-professional spouse's efforts in the 
family venture to obtain economic stability 
through education. For example, in Hubbard, 
603 P.2d at 747, the wife was allowed to 
recover from her physician husband contrib-
utions to his direct support, school and prof-
essional training expenses, plus reasonable 
interest and adjustments for inflation. 
A case recognizing more than strict financial 
contributions is Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 
357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984), in which the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota held, "in a 
proper case," the trial court should consider 
"all relevant factors" in awarding 
"reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony." 
These included "the amount of the supporting 
spouse's contributions, his or her foregone 
opportunities to enhance or improve profess-
ional or vocational skills, and the duration of 
the marriage following completion of the 
nonsupporting spouse's professional educa-
tion." Id. at 262. 
In Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash.2d 
168, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (Wash. 1984), the 
Supreme Court of Washington listed and 
analyzed several factors the trial court must 
consider "in determining the proper amount of 
compensation for the supporting spouse." 
These include the supporting spouse's contri-
butions for direct educational costs, no more 
than one-half what the couple would have 
earned had "the efforts of the student spouse 
not been directed towards his or her studies," 
"[a]ny educational or career opportunities 
which the supporting spouse gave up in order 
to obtain sufficiently lucrative employment, or 
to move to the city where the student spouse 
wished to attend schoolf,]" and "(tjhe future 
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earning prospects of each spouse, including 
the earning potential of the student spouse 
with the professional degree. * 
Wisconsin statutes allow a trial court to 
grant an order requiring maintenance paym-
ents to either party after considering several 
factors. Among these are: 
(4) The educational level of each 
party at the time of marriage and at 
the time the action is commenced. 
(5) The earning capacity of the 
party seeking maintenance, inclu-
ding educational background, trai-
ning, employment skills, work 
experience, length of absence from 
the job market, custodial responsi-
bilities for children and the time 
and expense necessary to acquire 
sufficient education or training to 
enable the party to find appropriate 
employment. 
(€) The feasibility that the party 
seeking maintenance can become 
self-supporting at a standard of 
living reasonably comparable to 
that enjoyed during the marriage, 
and, if so, the length of time nece-
ssary to achieve this goal. 
(8) Any mutual agreement made by 
the parties before or during the 
marriage, according to the terms of 
which one party has made financial 
or service contributions to the other 
with the expectation of reciproca-
tion or other compensation in the 
future, where such repayment has 
not been made, or any mutual 
agreement made by the parties 
before or during the marriage con-
cerning any arrangement for the 
financial support of the parties. 
(9) The contribution by one party to 
the education, training or increased 
earning power of the other. 
Wis. Stat. §767.26 (1982), See also Haugan v. 
Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796, 
800-01 n.4 (Wis. 1984). 
Clearly, some jurisdictions require courts to 
examine and value the contributions to a 
marriage partner's development. This appears 
to be the fair and equitable approach. There-
fore, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to an 
award of "equitable restitution* in addition to 
traditional alimony. We use the term equitable 
restitution to describe the award in order to 
establish a clear distinction between it and 
traditional alimony or any other form of 
spousal maintenance or support. The function 
of equitable restitution is to enable a spouse to 
share the newly obtained earning capacity of a 
former spouse who has achieved that capacity 
through the significant efforts and sacrifices of 
the requesting spouse which were detrimental 
to that spouse's development. It is nothing 
more than an equitable sharing of the rewards 
of both parties' common efforts and expect-
ations.1* 
Factors to be analyzed in determining an 
award of equitable restitution include, but are 
not limited to: (1) the length of the marriage; 
(2) the financial contributions and personal 
development sacrifices made by the requesting 
spouse; (3) the duration of these contributions 
and sacrifices during the marriage; (4) the 
resulting disparity in earning capacity between 
the requesting spouse and the spouse benefited 
thereby; and (5) the amount of property acc-
umulated during the marriage.11 An award of 
equitable restitution will not terminate upon 
plaintiffs remarriage, and may be payable in 
lump sum or periodically over time depending 
on the circumstances of each case.11 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part. The case is rem-
anded to the trial court for the purpose of 
taking any further evidence that may be nec-
essary to determine the amount of equitable 
restitution to be awarded to plaintiff and its 
manner of payment and for entry of judgment 
pursuant to this opinion. Costs against defe-
ndant. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. The decree of divorce utilizes the term 
"deduction* and the United States Code utilizes 
"exemption" when referring to the individual allo-
wance subtracted from income when computing tax 
owed. 
2. The lower court also found that plaintiff expected 
a 25^i reduction in her salary because of a volun-
tary transfer to a less stressful position within her 
employment. 
3. Section 78-45-7(2) lists the following factors to 
be considered in awarding prospective support: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(0 the age of the parlies; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
4. This Court notes, however, that a Task Force 
established by the Judicial Council is presently inv-
estigating the propriety of adopting Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines for Utah based upon current 
economic data. 
5. The award to age 21 was made by the trial court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §15-2-1 (1986). 
6. A review of plaintiffs expenses shows them to be 
extremely low and based upon what she actually 
spent rather than estimates of what she needed to 
sustain herself and her children at a reasonable sta-
ndard of living based upon the total family income. 
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7. It is argued that estimating the value of a medical 
degree is no more speculative than measuring 
damages in a wrongful death case. However, in 
wrongful death, the measurement begins at death 
and is subject to no future variables introduced by 
the decedent. Here, we must guess at the future 
course of defendant's career. Will he continue to 
practice in the same specialty in the same locale? A 
future decision or happenstance could totally change 
or even terminate the value of the medical degree. 
Can defendant then return to court to change the 
valuation and distribution based upon the more 
certain circumstances? Could plaintiff prevent def-
endant from making decisions which could impact 
the value of the degree? 
8. We must wonder whether defendant could have 
or would have entered and completed medical 
school had plaintiff obtained a divorce earlier. 
Defendant likely would have been obligated to pay 
alimony and child support. He would probably not 
have had the benefit of the family home and surely 
would not have had the benefit of plaintiffs part-
time work. 
9. Traditional alimony forces the recipient to make 
future choices with the understanding that such 
choices may result in the loss of alimony. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§30-3-5(5) and (6) (1987). No one 
should be forced into making such choices, partic-
ularly when the other party, who enjoys his position 
through the joint efforts of both parties, is under no 
similar restrictions on behavior. We note what the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court wrote in Hubbard v. 
Hubbard. 603 P.2d 747 (Okl*. 1979), when respo-
nding to the argument that the wife's recovery from 
her physician husband, whom she helped through 
medical school, be limited to alimony for support 
and maintenance. The per curiam decision reasoned 
"To do so would force her to forego remarriage and 
perhaps even be celibate for many years simply to 
realize a return on her investments and sacrifices of 
the past twelve years." Id. at 752 (footnote omitted). 
10. We emphasize the specific nature of the facts 
presented in this case and stress that equitable rest-
itution would not be awarded in the more frequent 
case where the marriage lasted for many years after 
the professional degree had been granted. There, 
sufficient assets would have been accumulated and 
an appropriate distribution to the requesting spouse 
would enable that spouse to share in the economic 
benefits earned as a result of the degree. 
11. Because this case establishes a new form of 
spousal award, we hesitate to state that the enume-
rated factors in determining equitable restitution are 
all inclusive as of the writing of this opinion. See 
Biswcll v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 86 n.5 (Utah App. 
1987). 
12. For example, in following the Utah Supreme 
Court's admonishment against unnecessarily tying a 
couple together after divorce as stated in Gardner, 
748 P.2d at 1079, defendant's lien on the family 
home might be extinguished and the amount cred-
ited against the overall award of equitable restitu-
tion. We recognize that this would probably be only 
a fraction of the total amount of equitable restitu-
tion awarded. 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully and loyally dissent. 
Loyal to the majority, but not to their 
opinion, I flag their decision as being at the 
forefront of judicial activism. I regret that I 
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could not dissuade my colleagues from brea-
king new ground with the invention of 
'equitable restitution." The opinion manufa-
ctures a divorce remedy that is (1) outside our 
statutory scheme;1 (2) without precedent in the 
pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court; 
(3) not requested by the appellant;* (4) forced 
on the trial courts for further development; (5) 
not needed to do justice to the parties in this 
case and may, in fact, work inequity. 
EQUITABLE RESTITUTION OR SUPPORT 
In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 
App. 1987), this court held that an advanced 
degree is not marital property subject to divi-
sion upon divorce, even where this achieve-
ment has been made possible through the 
assistance of the other spouse. We have, 
nonetheless, acknowledged that there may be 
situations where equity demands an extraord-
inary award of nontcrminable rehabilitative or 
reimbursement alimony in order to compen-
sate a spouse who "endurefs] substantial fin-
ancial sacrifices or defer[sJ her own education 
to help* the other spouse in obtaining an 
advanced degree. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 
P.2d 238, 241 (Utah App. 1987). This might 
occur where: (a) the parties mutually endeavor 
to increase one spouse's earning capacity, but 
at the time of trial the spouse who has bene-
fitted from the parties' endeavors is merely on 
the threshold of a substantial increase in ear-
nings, Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n.4; or (b) 
there is insufficient marital property from 
which to make a compensatory award to the 
contributing spouse. See Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988). In such 
cases, the spouse who has made substantial 
financial sacrifices and contributions to incr-
ease the earning capacity of the other spouse is 
entitled to recompense for those contributions 
that are beyond the duty of support normally 
associated with marriage, less any benefits 
received. See, e.g., Roberto v. Brown, 107 
Wis.2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982); Mahoney 
v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 
(1982). 
Decisions from other jurisdictions involving 
compensation of the spouse who has contrib-
uted to the attainment of an advanced degree 
have generally involved four factors: 
[FJirst, they share the loss of the 
husband's foregone earnings during 
the period of investment; second, 
the wife provides the financial 
capital to enable her husband to 
forego those earnings; third, she 
may forego opportunities to further 
the development of her own earning 
capacity; fourth, and most signifi-
cantly, they both expect to gain a 
return on the full costs of the inv-
estment through continuation of the 
marriage. Thus, the working spouse 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
coDe«co 
Provo, Utah 
Martinez v. Martinez 
80 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 43 
predicates her sacrifice of income 
and personal educational advance-
ment on the expectation of future 
returns to her from sharing in her 
husband's enhanced earning capa-
city. 
Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing 
Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the 
Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 Kan. 
L. Rev. 379, 380(1980). 
The extraordinary award fashioned by the 
majority in this case is inappropriate for 
several reasons. First, Mrs. Martinez did not 
provide the financial capital that enabled her 
husband to attain his college and advanced 
degree. Instead, Dr. Martinez provided the 
bulk of the family's financial support, in 
addition to paying for his education. This is 
not the classic "working spouse/student 
spouse" situation necessitating an extraordi-
nary award. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Haugan v. 
Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 
796, 799-800 (1984); Roberto, 318 N.W.2d 
358. 
Second, no evidence was presented that 
Mrs. Martinez deferred her own career or 
education in order to advance the education of 
her husband. Both parties had only high 
school educations at the time of marriage. 
Mrs. Martinez testified at trial that she wanted 
to continue her own education someday but 
had not yet begun doing so, even though her 
employer would pay three-fourths of her 
school costs and would allow her to continue 
working. 
While Mrs. Martinez raised the children and 
performed the household responsibilities, Dr. 
Martinez provided the family's primary fina-
ncial support in the form of his inheritance 
monies, funds from student loans.(which the 
trial court required him to repay), and proc-
eeds from his G.I. Bill. Mrs. Martinez worked 
part-time during three of the seventeen years 
of their marriage. Her nominal total earnings 
of approximately $2,300 were applied to 
family living expenses. During the marriage, 
the family took modest vacations, purchased 
two homes, furniture and furnishings, and two 
automobiles. Equity simply does not demand 
an extraordinary remedy in this case because 
no extraordinary injustice is present. 
Even if Mrs. Martinez had made substantial 
financial contributions or educational sacrif-
ices in order to further her husband's educa-
tion and career, there are other reasons why 
the creation of a new hybrid award of equit-
able restitution is not warranted in this case. 
Unlike the hypothetical case contemplated by 
this court in Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n.4, in 
which the spouse with an advanced degree is 
only on the threshold of reaping an enhanced 
income at the time of the parties' divorce, Dr. 
Martinez was already earning a gross annual 
income of $100,000. He is not merely at the 
threshold of significant earnings; he is already 
standing in the parlor. In addition, the parties 
here accumulated real and personal property 
from which a compensatory property award 
could be made: $34,561 equity in a home; 
three vehicles worth $3,995; an IRA account 
valued at $2,000; stocks of unknown value; 
and household furnishings valued at $6,500. 
The presence of both substantial earnings and 
accumulated property at the time of the 
divorce provides an adequate basis for rende-
ring an extraordinary remedy, if Mrs. Mart-
inez is entitled to recompense. 
On the facts presented in this case, there are 
additional reasons why 1 believe the majority's 
disposition of this appeal is misguided: (1) 
equity can be achieved under current alimony 
and property distribution statutes and case 
law; (2) an award of equitable restitution 
coupled with the majority's generous alimony 
and child support awards is double-dipping; 
and (3) an award of equitable restitution, in 
effect, treats the professional education as 
"property" subject to division upon dissolution 
of a marriage. 
First, in fashioning an award of alimony, 
the trial court must consider the financial 
condition and needs of the recipient spouse,3 
the ability of that spouse to be self-
supporting, and the ability of the other spouse 
to pay. Paffel v. Paffcl. 732 P.2d 96, 100-01 
(Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1075 (Utah 1985). 
Dr. and Mrs. Martinez were married for 
approximately seventeen years. The trial court 
found that Dr. Martinez incurs expenses ass-
ociated with his employment of approximately 
$7,000 per year, leaving approximately $93,000 
annually or $7,750 per month. Mrs. Martinez 
earned approximately $1,033 per month and 
estimated that she required $2,050 per month 
to meet the expenses for herself and the three 
children. Under the temporary support order, 
she had been receiving $1,100 per month in 
child support. She sought additional monies to 
make up the difference between her net earn-
ings and expenses and to provide her with the 
means to make major house repairs.~In-the 
event that a professional degree was not 
viewed as a marital asset, she sought an 
alimony award not subject to termination 
upon remarriage. 
The trial court stated that it considered the 
large disparity between the parties' respective 
earning abilities and the fact that the wife's 
resources were inadequate to meet her needs. 
However, I agree with Mrs. Martinez that the 
trial court failed to apply these factors corre-
ctly in that the award of $400 per month 
alimony, nonterminable for three years and 
continuing for a period of five years, is so low 
as to constitute a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion. Mrs. Martinez earns $1,033 
gross income per month. The alimony 
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awarded by the trial court, plus her net 
monthly earnings of $846, provides her with 
approximately $1,246 with which to meet her 
monthly expenses, excluding sums awarded for 
child support. In contrast, Dr. Martinez 
enjoys approximately $7,750 gross monthly 
income. Considering the disparate earning 
capacities, the trial court's alimony award was 
insufficient and inequitable in that it failed to 
provide the parties with a comparable stan-
dard of living. 
Second, based on Dr. Martinez's earnings 
at the time of trial, the majority has increased 
total child support from $900 to $1,800 and 
increased the duration and amount of alimony 
to a permanent award of $750 per month. An 
award of equitable restitution on top of the 
already generous awards of alimony and child 
support fashioned by the majority is duplica-
tive and not necessary to achieve equity. 
Finally, an advanced degree is the memori-
alization of an individual's "attainment of the 
skill, qualification and educational backgr-
ound which is the prerequisite of the enhanced 
earning capacity." Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 
357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D. 1984); cf. Pete-
rsen, 737 P.2d at 240 (quoting In re Marriage 
of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 
(1978)(en banc)). The value of an advanced 
degree lies in the potential for increased ear-
nings made possible by the degree and by 
other factors and conditions of employment. 
If the advanced degree itself does not fall 
within the classification of marital "property" 
subject to distribution upon divorce, then 
neither should an individual's enhanced 
earning capacity. Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 151, 486 A.2d 951 (1984); Wehr-
kamp, 357 N.W.2d at 266; Stern v. 
N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). 
The majority declares that: 
The function of equitable restitution 
is to enable a spouse to share the newly 
obtained earning capacity of 
a former spouse who has achieved 
that capacity through the significant 
efforts and sacrifices of the reque-
sting spouse which were detrimental 
to that spouse's development. It is 
nothing more than an equitable 
sharing of the rewards of both 
parties' common efforts and expe-
ctations. 
By creating a divisible interest in Dr. Mar-
tinez's enhanced earning capacity, this court 
has awarded a nonterminable property interest 
in a medical degree which goes beyond the 
compensation approved in Petersen. The 
majority has not limited its award to Mrs. 
Mar t inez ' s cont r ibu t ions toward her 
husband's medical education costs; it has 
taken the further step of providing financial 
recompense for lost expectations. I would 
reject any compensation formula based on 
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future earning capacity. The factors and var-
iables involved in the valuation of an enha-
nced earning capacity are as speculative as 
those involved in an attempt to value an adv-
anced degree; such speculation can only lead 
to inequity. 
Provision for Mrs. Martinez's needs is best 
dealt with through a generous but fair distri-
bution of property and award of alimony,4 not 
through the creation of a distinctly new form 
of cleverly disguised marital property for 
which there is no precedent. 
! CHILD SUPPORT 
Both husband and wife have a duty to 
support their children. Utah Code Ann. 
§§78-45-3, -4 (1987). "Child support 
awards should approximate actual need, and, 
when possible, assure the children a standard 
of living comparable to that which they would 
have experienced if no divorce had occurred/ 
Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
The trial court found that Dr. Martinez 
earned approximately $7,750 gross income per 
month. Dr. Martinez testified that his earnings 
were established under a two-year employ-
ment contract, that he was in the 50^o tax 
bracket, and that he had no tax shelter. The 
trial court also found that Mrs. Martinez 
earned approximately $1,033 gross income per 
month. Mrs. Martinez testified to net monthly 
earnings of $846 plus nominal royalties from 
an oil well. She anticipated a reduction in her 
earnings as a result of her voluntary cutback 
in working hours. Mrs. Martinez calculated 
monthly living expenses for herself and the 
three children at $2,050. This was the only 
evidence of the dollar amount of the chil-
dren's monthly need for support. The majo-
rity has elected to disregard that evidence 
because they think the figure was too low. 
Having rejected the only evidence of the chil-
dren's need, the majority makes its own ind-
ependent estimate. 
Using their own estimate of need and the 
parties' gross monthly incomes, the majority 
has awarded $600 per month per-child for a 
, total of $1,800.$ Their action fails to account 
J for the effects on each party of: (I) tax rate 
changes under the 1986 Tax Reform Act;* (2) 
their award of the tax exemptions for all the 
children to Mrs. Martinez; (3) the disposition 
of the home mortgage debt as discussed 
below; (4) their increase of alimony from $400 
to $750 per month; and (5) their equitable 
restitution award in an amount to be determ-
ined by the trial court. 
I would remand this case on the child 
support issue for the taking of further evid-
ence and a current determination of the chil-
dren's need and the ability of both parents to 
pay child support, to be considered with the 
other appropriate adjustments in the parties' 
incomes and liabilities. 
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HOME MORTGAGE 
The parties stipulated at trial that their 
jointly-acquired home had a current market 
value of $63,000 and an equity of $34,561. 
The stipulated figures reveal the existence of a 
home mortgage obligation in the sum of 
$28,439. However, neither the trial court nor 
counsel identified this sizeable debt in the 
distribution of debts and property. Nor do the 
trial court's written Findings of Fact specify 
who must assume the $28,439 mortgage obli-
gation and make the payments. The record 
reveals that Mrs. Martinez had been making a 
$309 monthly mortgage payment and the court 
stated that each party was to assume and dis-
charge those debts that they have been paying. 
Paragraph 19 of the written Findings of 
Fact states that the "[pjlaintiff [Mrs. Martinez) 
should be awarded the exclusive use and occ-
upancy of the parties' residence subject to a 
lien in favor of Defendant for the sum of 
$17,528.00 ..." The Decree of Divorce reiter-
ates this language and awards plaintiff 
"exclusive use and occupancy," subject to a 
lien in defendant's favor. The court's oral 
ruling was: "(t]he Court will award to the the 
[sic] Plaintiff the home of the parties, subject 
to a lien for defendant's share of the equity in 
the amount of one-half of the net equity." 
The court's allocation of the parties' fina-
ncial obligations includes no reference to 
$28,439 of mortgage debt. Mrs. Martinez was 
required to pay specified debts and obligations 
totalling $8,179.73. The $28,439 was not spe-
cified and does not appear in the record. Dr. 
Martinez was required to pay specified debts 
and obligations totalling $26,169.04. If Mrs. 
Martinez must assume and pay the house 
mortgage, her post-divorce debt responsibi-
lity is $36,618.73, $10,449.69 more than his. 
Conclusion of Law C provides that, "[i]n 
order to make the distribution ... [of marital 
property) as equal as possible, Plaintiff should 
be awarded the real property ... subject to a 
lien in favor of Defendant for one-half of 
the present equity therein, that being for the 
sum of $17,678." Although the stated objec-
tive is equality of distribution, the requirement 
that Mrs. Martinez assume and pay the mor-
tgage would burden her by an additional 
$14,219.50 (1/2 of $28,439), despite the 
parties' widely disparate disposable income 
and the fact that Mrs. Martinez must support 
herself and the children on less than $2,200 
per month. Since the court failed to specific-
ally identify the home mortgage, the court also 
failed to include the amount of $28,439 in the 
equity calculation. Thus Mrs. Martinez 
became personally responsible to pay the 
major debt of the parties. 
The trial court's inclusion of the home 
mortgage in Mrs. Martinez's debt burden as 
part of the property and debt distribution is 
an abuse of discretion, even without looking 
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at the gross disparity of income. The home 
mortgage matter alone justifies a remand. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority has fixed the amount of 
alimony and child support to be paid. This 
action deprives the trial court, on remand, of 
any flexibility to adjust the debts, property, 
alimony, and support awards and to fashion 
an overall award package that harmonizes all 
the variables. The trial court's discretion will 
be so restricted that an equitable outcome will 
be impossible. This case should instead be 
remanded for retrial on the alimony, child 
support and property distribution issues. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. The majority acknowledges the existence ot our 
divorce statutes in remanding the child support and 
alimony issues. The majority states, (a) "On 
remand, the trial court shall enter its order for child 
support in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §30-
3-5.1 (1987)/ i.e., raise the total amount of child 
support from $900 to $1,800 per month; (b) "(Wje 
award permanent alimony in the sum of $750 per 
month subject to the provisions ot Utah Code Ann 
§30-3-5 (1987)," i.e., increase alimony from the 
$400 awarded by the trial court. However, no 
statute is cited as the basis for equitable restitution 
Our divorce statutes and case law authorize onlv the 
distribution o( property and an award ot support 
for the benefit of the spouse and children Utah 
Code Ann §§30-3-1 to 10 6(198'7) 
2. Mrs Martinez argued both at trial and on appeal 
that a professional degree is a property interest 
subject to division upon divorce. Since equitable 
restitution was not a part of Utah lavs until this 
majority opinion was crafted, the trial was not 
conducted and the evidence was not presented under 
that theory. 
3 In determining the "need" of the recipient nons-
tudent spouse, the trial court is not limited to con-
sidering only the low living expenses incurred during 
the time that the other spouse studied to obtain an 
advanced degree. The Utah Supreme Couii recentlv 
stated in Gardner, a :ase also involving an advanced 
degree, that alimony should "equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living and maintain them at 
a level as close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage " Gardner, 748 P 2d at 
1081; accord Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 
(Utah App 1987), Petersen, 737 P 2d at 239. Olson 
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985), Higley v 
Higley, 676 P 2d 37<>, 381 (Utah 1983) Although 
Gardner involved a marriage in which the parties 
enjoyed a high standard of living for many years 
prior to the divorce, the language of Gardner was 
clearly aimed at preventing the divorced spouse of a 
high income earner from suffering a major decline 
in standard of living following a divorce. This lan-
guage should not be construed as prohibiting a trial 
court from making an award that raises the recipient 
spouse's standard ot living from what it was dunng 
the marriage where, as here, the student spouse 
experiences a major increase in earnings just prior to 
the marriage's termination In other words, the 
"need" of the recipient spouse in this situation is not 
necessarily what he or she managed to live on 
during the lean school years 
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4. Unlike the majority's award of equitable restit-
ution, an alimony award can be modified, in appr-
opriate circumstances, under the court's exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction Utah Code Ann §30-3-
5(3X1987) This is particularly important in the sit-
uation presented here, where Dr Martinez is 
working under a contract of limited duration 
5 The majority opinion interchanges the terms 
"adjusted gross income" and "gross income" in 
comparing the amount of child support awarded by 
the trial court with an award calculated under gui-
delines from Colorado and Wisconsin, even though 
the terms have markedly different meanings Alth-
ough the majority disclaims reliance on the child 
support guidelines from other jurisdictions, they do, 
in fact, rely upon the potentially greater amounts 
available in other jurisdictions in order to justify an 
award of $600 per month per child 
The problem with this analysis is that the guidel-
ines adopted by other jurisdictions are irrelevant for 
purposes of an award in Utah Child support guid-
elines utilize different approaches to allocate econ-
omic responsibility for children of divorced parents 
depending upon varying pubbc policy See generally 
Cassetty, "Emerging Issues in Child Support Policy 
and Practice," in The Parental Child Support Obli-
gation Research, Pracuce and Policy 3 (J Cassetty 
ed 1983) 
As the majority opinion demonstrates, the reco-
mmended amount of child support under other 
jurisdictions' guidelines may radically differ because 
of differences in the underlying policy goals adopted 
by a given state The guidelines of some states, such 
as Wisconsin, do not adjust for the income of the 
custodial parent This is obviously inconsistent with 
Utah's adoption of a public policy which holds both 
parents responsible for the support of their children 
For these reasons, whether the support guidelines in 
other states would afford a higher level of support 
should not be a factor in making an equitable award 
in Utah 
6 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 will have a signifi-
cant impact on Dr Martinez's disposable income, 
assuming ongoing gross income in the $100,000 
range He testified at trial that he had to set aside 
one-half of his income to pay taxes For 1988 and 
later tax years, there are two basic tax rates for 
individuals, 15ft and 28ft In addition, the law 
effectively creates a third rate of 33ft on income 
above certain levels Thus, portions of Dr Mart-
inez's income will be taxed at 15ft, 28ft, and 33ft 
rather than all at 50ft Moreover, Utah income tax 
laws have changed in the interim Counsel in divorce 
actions would be well advised to provide the trial 
court with complete information regarding the tax 
implications of the property distribution, alimony, 
child support and dependency exemption arrange-
ments being proposed The combined disposable 
income available to the severed family can often be 
increased by prudent tax planning dunng a divorce 
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Gary V. PETERSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Julie A. PETERSEN, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 860007-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 18, 1987. 
Parties' marriage was dissolved by the 
Second District Court, Weber County, Cal-
vin Gould, J., and husband appealed from 
court's division of marital property. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) 
medical degree that husband earned during 
marriage while wife was principal wage 
earner did not constitute "property" sub-
ject to division in connection with parties' 
divorce, but (2) award of $1,000 per month 
to wife, to compensate her for her "share" 
in husband's advanced degree, could be 
sustained Dy recharacterizing it as provi-
sion for additional alimony. 
Affirmed and remanded with di-
rections. 
PETERSEN v. PETERSEN 
Cite a* 737 ?2d 237 (Uuh App. 1987) 
4. Divorce <3=237 
Traditional alimony analysis is appro-
priate and adequate method for making 
adjustments between spouses, one of whom 
has helped finance the other's advanced 
education, where divorce does not take 
place until several years after second 
spouse has earned his/her degree. 
5. Divorce «=>247 
"Rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" 
alimony not terminable upon remarriage 
may be appropriate, to compensate one 
spouse for sacrifice of helping to finance 
other spouse's advanced degree, where di-
vorce takes place shortly after degree is 
obtained, before first spouse has had 
chance to enjoy comfortable life-style 
which degree will permit. 
1. Divorce <3=184(4) 
Generally, trial court is permitted con-
siderable discretion in adjusting financial 
and property interests of parties to divorce 
action, and its determinations are entitled 
to presumption of validity. 
2. Divorce <&=*252.3(1) 
Medical degree that husband earned 
while wife was principal wage earner was 
not "property" subject to division in con-
nection with parties' divorce. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Divorce <*=>252.3(1) 
Advanced degree is or confers intangi-
ble right which cannot properly be charac-
terized as "property," subject to division 
between spouses in connection with their 
divorce; declining to follow Daniels v. 
Daniels, 20 Ohio 0p.2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773. 
6. Divorce <s=>240(2) 
Award of $1,000 per month to doctor's 
wife, to compensate wife for her "share" in 
husbands medical degree, could be sus-
tained bv recharacterizing not as
 nrnnt>n 
settlement but as
 p r o v i s ion for additional 
alimony, to extent such additional alimony 
was warranted under circumstances. 
7. Divorce e=>237 
Criteria considered in determining rea-
sonable award of support must include fi-
nancial conditions and needs of spouse in 
need of support, ability of that spouse to 
produce sufficient income for his or her 
own support, and ability of other spouse to 
provide support. 
8. Divorce «=240(2) 
Alimony of $2,000 per month was not 
unreasonable, where wife had substantially 
financed husband's medical education sub-
sequently became accustomed to comforta-
ble life style that medical degree made 
possible, and enjoyed much different earn-
ing potential than that of husband to 
whom all of income-producing assets had 
been awarded. 
Paul M. Belnap, Strong & Hanni, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant 
Pete N. Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, Ogden 
for plaintiff and appellant 
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Before ORME, JACKSON and 
BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
The appellant seeks a reversal or read-
justment of the property division and ali-
mony awarded to his former wife upon 
their divorce. His challenge focuses on a 
$120,000 property settlement given to his 
ex-wife to reflect her interest in his medical 
degree. We affirm the trial court's basic 
disposition, but require amendment of the 
decree insofar as the $120,000 award is 
concerned. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties were married in September 
1963 when they were both entering their 
senior year of college. Both graduated 
with Bachelor's degrees. Dr. Petersen con-
tinued his educatiun and obtained a Mas-
ter's degree, while Mrs. Petersen worked 
as an elementary school teacher to help 
finance her husband's education. After re-
ceiving his Master's degree, Dr. Petersen 
entered medical school. During medical 
school, Dr. Petersen earned approximately 
$1,000 per year in income. The couple also 
took out a student loan and received some 
money from Mrs. Petersen's parents. 
While her husband was in medical school, 
Mrs. Petersen worked one year on a full 
time basis and three years part time. 
When Dr. Petersen began his internship, 
Mrs. Petersen stopped working to stay at 
home with their child. During the next 
fifteen years, Mrs. Petersen was not em-
ployed outside the home and her teaching 
certification expired. 
By the time of their divorce, the parties 
had been married twenty years and had six 
children under the age of 18. The decree 
gave Mrs. Petersen custody of the six mi-
nor children, the family residence subject 
to the first mortgage, most of the family 
furniture, and two automobiles. She was 
awarded $300 per month per child as child 
support, $1,000 per month alimony, and the 
cash property settlement of $120,000, 
which Dr. Petersen was to pay in install-
ments of $1,000 per month without inter-
est 
Under the decree, Dr. Petersen received 
his professional corporation, the total inter-
est in his pension and profit sharing plan, 
two condominiums, a boat, an undivided 
one-seventh interest in a cabin near Bear 
Lake, and other rental property. He also 
was given the right to claim all six children 
as dependents for income tax purposes. 
The trial court explained the $120,000 
cash settlement as follows: 
The Court believes that this case is clas-
sic, in that defendant is entitled to a 
property award reflecting an ownership 
interest of the defendant in plaintiffs 
medical degree. It is abundantly clear 
that defendant helped plaintiff earn that 
degree during their marriage, and that 
plaintiffs ability to earn is based upon 
that degree. Further, that following the 
earning of the degree and the entry into 
the medical practice, by mutual agree-
ment, defendant undertook the raising 
and nurturing of the children as her re-
sponsibility to the marital partnership, 
while plaintiff practiced medicine. It is 
difficult to find in the evidence presented 
any system for the measurement of the 
value of the degree, and the Court must 
therefore deal with the case mostly upon 
an alimony basis. To deal with the case 
fully upon an alimony basis is not fair to 
the defendant, inasmuch as any effort to 
restructure her life by seeking to better 
her employment opportunities or to re-
marry will operate against her alimony 
rights. Defendant is therefore awarded 
$1,000 per month permanent alimony and 
a lump sum property award in respect to 
the medical degree in the amount of 
$120,000, payable in installments of 
$1,000 per month from the date of the 
decree. 
On appeal, Dr. Petersen argues that the 
division of marital property was ineq-
uitable, particularly the $120,000 property 
settlement given to his wife. Dr. Petersen 
argues that it was error to characterize 
"his" medical degree as marital property 
and require him to cash out Mrs. Peter-
PETERSEN v. PETERSEN Utah 2 3 9 
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sen's interest therein over a 10-year pen 000 as a property award, payable in $1,000 
od monthly installments Characterization of 
these payments as a property award cre-
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRE- ated the main issue for appeal 
LIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
[1] Generally, the tnal court is permit 
ted considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial and property interests of the par 
ties to a divorce action, and its determina-
tions are entitled to a presumption of validi 
ty Eg, Burnham i Burnham, 716 P 2d 
781, 782 (Utah 1986) And although appel 
late courts may weigh the evidence and 
substitute their judgment for that of the 
tnal court in divorce actions, as the Su-
preme Court stated in Turner v Turner, 
649 P 2d 6 (Utah 1982), "this court will not 
do so lightly and merely because its judg 
ment may differ from that of the trial 
judge A trial court's apportionment of 
property will not be disturbed unless it 
works such a manifest injustice or inequitv 
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion 
649 P 2d at 8 
In the present case, the trial court appro 
pnately attempted to equalize tne parties 
respective standards of living See Olson 
v Olson, 704 P2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985) 
Dr Petersen was found capable of earning 
$100,000 per year while Mrs Petersen s 
ability to obtain recertification and secure a 
teaching contract was found to be specula 
bve at best Even if she succeeded, she 
would earn only one-fourth to one fifth of 
what Dr Petersen would earn annually 
The trial court spoke of the difficulty of 
measuring the value of Dr Petersen's de-
gree The court chose to balance the ine-
qualities between the parties partly with 
the alimony award However, the tnal 
court did not want Mrs Petersen to lose all 
of her entitlement upon remarriage, so the 
trial court provided for an additional $120, 
I. In Dogu v Dogu, 652 P2d 1308 (Utah 1982) 
the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the valua 
uon of a professional corporation In Dogu the 
husband was awarded his protessional corpora 
uon, and his wife was awarded property to 
offset its value 652 P 2d at 1309 Although the 
proper characterization of a medical degree as 
in the present case, and the valuation of a pro-
fessional medical corporation as in Dogu, may 
involve related questions, the legal issues re 
garding the two are distinct 
DEGREES AS PROPERTY 
[2] The question of whether an ad 
vanced degree is a property interest sub-
ject to division upon divorce is one of first 
impression at the appellate level in Utah ! 
However, the majority of jurisdictions that 
have considered the issue have held that 
advanced degrees or professional licenses 
are not property Wtsner v Wxsner, 129 
Ariz 333, 631 P 2d 115, 122 (Anz App 1981) 
(husband's medical license and board certif-
icate are not property subject to division, 
but education is a factor to be considered in 
arriving at equitable property division, 
maintenance, and child support), In re 
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal App 3d 446, 
152 Cal Rptr 668 677 (1979) (legal edu 
cation not a property right), In re Mar 
mage of Graham 194 Colo 429, 574 P 2d 
75, 77 (1978) (MBA degree not marital 
properU subject to division) In re Mar 
nage oj Hortsman 263 N W 2d 885, 891 
(Iowa 1978) (law degree is not a distnbuta 
ble asset upon divorce future earnings 
are), Olah v Olah, 135 Mich App 404, 354 
N W 2d 359 361 (Mich App 1984) (medical 
degree not properly or marital asset) Ma 
honey i Mahoney 91 N J 488 453 A 2d 
527, 536 (1982) (courts mav not make any 
permanent distribution of the value of pro-
fessional degrees and licenses, whether 
based on estimated worth or cost), Ruben 
v Ruben, 123 N H 358, 461 A 2d 733, 735 
(1983) (graduate degree acquired by one 
spouse dunng the marriage is not an asset 
subject to division upon divorce), Muckler 
oy v Muckleroy, 84 N M 14, 498 P 2d 
1357, 1358 (1972) (medical license is not 
In Tremayne v Tremayne, 116 Utah 483 211 
P2d 452 (1949) the Supreme Court upheld the 
trial court s property division and award of ah 
mony to the wife referring to the wife s work 
mg to help her husband through school the 
fact that with the divorce the wife was de 
pnved of the benefits of his increased earnings 
and the discrepancy in their earning capacities 
Tremayne does not address the issue of whether 
an advanced degree or license is marital proper 
ty 
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community property), Hubbard v Hub-
bard, 603 P2d 747, 750-51 (Okl 1979) 
(medical license not property but wife enti-
tled to compensation for her investment)2 
These cases and others are consistent 
with our understanding of what "property" 
island what an educational degree is 
Property can be bought, sold, and devised 
Bona fide degrees cannot be bought, they 
are earned They cannot be sold, they are 
personal to the named recipient Upon the 
death of the named recipient, the certificate 
commemorating award of the degree might 
be passed along and treasured as a family 
heirloom, but the recipient may not, on the 
strength of that degree, practice law or 
medicine In this case, the court awarded 
the parties' home to Mrs Peterson But it 
might have awarded the home to Dr Peter 
sen or it might have ordered the home sold 
and the net proceeds divided The court 
had no such alternatives with the medical 
degree preciselv because the degree is not 
property Consideration of some of the 
cases cited above and others supports our 
fundamental conclusion and demonstrates 
the range of related problems 
In Muckleroy v Muckleroy, 84 N M 14, 
498 P2d 1357 (1972), it had been argued 
that the husband's education was the prod 
uct of the joint labor and industry of both 
parties, so that after their marriage it was 
community property The New Mexico Su-
preme Court rejected this argument and 
concluded 
A medical license is only a permit issued 
by the controlling authority of the State, 
authorizing the individual licensee to en-
gage in the practice of medicine The 
medical license may be used and enjoyed 
by the licensee as a means of earning a 
livelihood, but it is not community prop-
erty because it cannot be the subject of 
joint ownership 
84 N M at 15, 498 P 2d at 1358 
The same issue arose as to an MBA 
degree earned by the husband in In re 
2. The question of whether an advanced degree 
or professional license is marital property sub-
ject to division upon divorce has attracted con 
siderable attention from legal scholars. For 
one of the better reasoned discussions, see Note, 
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo 429, 574 
P 2d 75 (1978) Again, the concept of an 
advanced degree being property was reject 
ed 
An educational degree, such as an 
M B A , is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
"property" It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transfer 
able value on an open market It is 
personal to the holder It terminates on 
death of the holder and is not inheritable 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property In 
our Me" , 't has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term 
194 Colo at 432, 574 P 2d at 77 
The wife in Graham had worked full 
time throughout the couple's six year mar 
nage, and had contributed 70 percent of 
the family income in addition to most of the 
household work while her husband was ac 
quiring his degree The trial court found 
that the degree was jointly owned property 
and had determined that the future earning 
value of the M B A degree to Mr Graham 
was $82,836 00 Mrs Graham was award-
ed $33,134 00 of that amount On appeal, 
the state supreme court affirmed the rever-
sal of the trial court by the court of ap-
peals 574 P 2d at 76 The fact that the 
decision left Mrs Graham with nothing to 
show for her six years of labor prompted a 
three judge dissent which strongly urged 
that the husband's increased earning power 
represented by the degree should be con 
sidered marital property, where there was 
no accumulated property and the spouse 
Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law 
A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees 
and Professional Licenses from the Marital Es 
tate, 11 Hofstra LRev 1327 (1983) 
PETERSEN v. PETERSEN 
Cite M 737 ?JA 237 (Utah App 1987) 
Utah 241 
who subsidized the degree was ineligible 
for maintenance 3 574 P 2d at 7&-79 
The equitable concerns addressed in the 
Graham dissent are reflected in the few 
cases that have found an advanced degree 
or professional license to be mantal proper-
ty 
In Daniels v Daniels, 185 N E 2d 773 
(Ohio 1961), the court held that the right to 
practice medicine was in the nature of a 
franchise and constituted property which 
the trial court had a right to consider in 
making an award of alimony In Daniels, 
the parties to the action were married while 
students at a university During the time 
of their mamage the wife received her 
degree in business administration and the 
husband received a degree in medicine one 
vear later Each contributed toward his or 
her own maintenance and education, the 
balance in financial support for the family 
coming from the wife s father, who contnb 
uted sizable sums to the mamage At the 
time of their divorce, neither party had 
much in the way of tangible assets The 
court awarded $24 000 in lump sum alimo-
ny, but did not actually divide the value of 
the medical degree 185 N E 2d at 776 
Recenth, in 0 'Bnen v 0 Bnen, 66 
N Y 2d 576 489 N E 2d 712, 498 N Y S 2d 
743 (1985) the New York Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial courts holding that a 
license to practice medicine acquired dunng 
the marriage is marital property subject to 
division In O'Brien, the wife was held 
entitled to a 40 percent interest in her 
husband's medical license The wife had 
contributed approximately 76 percent of 
the couples' total income while the husband 
obtained his license The breakdown of the 
mamage occurred shortly after the hus 
band completed his schooling, and the only 
tangible asset existing after their nine-year 
marriage was the husband's medical h 
cense 
The New York court distinguished its 
analysis in 0 'Bnen from that of other jur 
isdictions which have found a license or 
advanced degree not to be mantal proper 
ty. As the O'Brien court explained 
3- In Graham, the wife did not request alimony 
because a Colorado statute Colo Rev Stat § 14-
10-114 (1973), restricted the courts power to 
Plaintiff does not contend that his license 
is excluded from distribution because it 
is separate property, rather, he claims 
that it is not property at all but repre-
sents a personal attainment in acquinng 
knowledge He rests his argument on 
decisions in similar cases from other jur-
isdictions and on his view that a license 
does not satisfy common law concepts of 
property Neither contention is control-
ling because decisions in other States 
rely pnncipally on their own statutes, 
and the legislative history underlying 
them, and because the New York Legis-
lature deliberately went beyond tradition-
al property concepts when it formulated 
the Equitable Distnbution Law 
66 N Y 2d at 583, 489 N E 2d at 715, 498 
N Y S 2d at 746 New York's highest court 
acknowledged in O'Brien that then statute 
creates a new species of property previous 
ly unknown at common law or under pnor 
statutes 66 N Y 2d at 586, 489 N E 2d at 
719 498 N Y S 2d at 748 Cntical portions 
of the New York Equitable Distnbution 
Law provide that in making an equitable 
distribution of mantal property, the court 
shall consider the efforts one spouse made 
to the other spouse's career or career po-
tential and the difficulty of evaluating an 
interest in a profession 66 N Y 2d at 584, 
489 NE2d at 715-16, 498 N Y S 2d at 
746-47 Thus, the analysis in O'Brien, al 
though illustrative of the equitable con 
cerns for the working spouse who supports 
the other through an advanced degree, 66 
NY 2d at 585-88, 489 N E 2d at 716-18, 
498 N Y S 2d at 746-48, is limited in appli 
cation because of the pivotal role of the 
unusual and expansive distnbution statute 
enacted in New York 
[3-5] We agree with the majonty opin-
ion in Graham that an advanced degree is 
or confers an intangible nght which, be 
cause of its character, cannot properly be 
characterized as property subject to divi-
sion between the spouses No special stat-
ute, as in New York, permits us to treat 
the degree as though it were property On 
award maintenance to cases where the spouse 
seeking it was unable to support himself or 
herself 574 P 2d at 79 
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the other hand, criteria for an award of 
support in Utah are not so rigid as in 
Colorado, preventing the harsh result of 
Graham $ftf this fctate, traditional alimony 
analysis is the appropriate and adequate 
method for making adjustments between 
the parties in cases of this type.4 
AWARD IN THIS CASE 
[6] As indicated, the trial court was in 
error when it awarded Mrs Petersen the 
$120,000 cash settlement to reflect her 
share of the value of her husband's medical 
degree Nonetheless, the court's basic dis-
position was fair and can be sustained if 
the $1,000 monthly payments which Dr 
Petersen was to make in satisfaction of 
that obligation are recharacterized as addi 
tional alimony, a result which is readily 
supported by the trial court's findings 
In reviewing the court's f.nd ngs, «VP find 
ample evidence to affirm the property divi 
sion aside from the $120,000 cash settle 
ment As the Supreme Court stated in 
Fletcher v Fletcher, 615 P 2d 1218 (Utah 
1980), "[tjhere is no fixed formula upon 
which to determine a division of properties, 
it is a prerogative of the court to make 
whatever disposition of property as it 
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for 
the protection and welfare of the parties " 
615 P 2d at 1222 Although Dr Petersen 
was awarded a smaller percentage of the 
marital assets, he received all but one of 
the income producing assets his profes-
sional corporation, his pension and profit 
sharing plan, two condominiums, and other 
business interests The parties were to 
share evenly in a $10,000 investment corpo-
4 In cases like the instant one, life patterns have 
largely been set the earning potential of both 
parties can be predicted with some reliability, 
and the contributions and sacrifices of the one 
spouse in enabling the other to attain a degree 
have been compensated by many years of the 
comfortable lifestyle which the degree permit 
ted Traditional alimony analysis works nicely 
to assure equity in such cases 
In another kind of recurring case, typified by 
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the 
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis 
would often work hardship because, while both 
spouses have modest incomes at the time of 
divorce the one is on the threshhold of a signifi 
cant increase in earnings. Moreover, the 
ration We find the basic property division 
equitable 
[71 As for the cash settlement payable 
in monthly installments of $1,000, it is 
properly affirmed as alimony, making Mrs 
Petersen's entire alimony award $2,000 per 
month. Criteria considered in determining 
a reasonable award of support must in-
clude the financial conditions and needs of 
the spouse in need of support, the ability of 
that spouse to produce sufficient income 
for his or her own support, and the ability 
of the other spouse to provide support 
Jones v Jones, 700 P 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985) 
[8] In this case, then, the first factor to 
be considered is the financial condition and 
needs of Mrs Petersen For over ten 
years, Mrs Petersen and her family en-
joyed a very comfortable lifestyle She 
now must make mortgage payments on tne 
home and pay for the ordinary expenses of 
food, clothing and transportation Other 
than the one-half interest in the investment 
corporation, Mrs Petersen was awarded 
none of the income-producing assets She 
has no outside income 
The second factor to be considered is 
Mrs Petersen's ability to produce a suffi-
cient income for herself Although Mrs 
Petersen is a college graduate with a Bach 
elor's degree and is trained as a school 
teacher, she is not currently certified She 
would require additional training to become 
certified and, even if certified, her ability to 
produce income would be one-fourth to one-
fifth of what Dr Petersen's income has 
provided the family The trial court found 
spouse who sacrificed so the other could attain 
a degree is precluded from enjoying the antici 
pated dividends the degree will ordinarily pro-
vide Nonetheless, such a spouse is typically 
not remote in time from his or her previous 
education and is otherwise better able to adjust 
and to acquire comparable skills, given the op-
portunity and the funding In such cases, ali-
mony analysis must become more creative to 
achieve fairness, and an award of "rehabilita-
tive" or "reimbursement" alimony, not termina-
ble upon remarriage, may be appropriate. See, 
e.g, Haugan v Haugan, 117 Wis 2d 200 343 
NW2d 796 (1984), Mahoney v Mahoney, 91 
NJ 488. 453 A 2d 527 (1982) 
PETERSEN v. PETERSEN 
Cite m* 737 P24 237 (Utah App 1987) 
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that the chance of her being able to secure 
a teaching contract was "speculative" 
During most of the marriage, Mrs Peter 
sen was not employed outside the home 
She stopped working, primarily at the urg-
ing of her husband, and devoted her time 
to raising their six children It is unrea-
sonable to assume that she will be able 
immediately to enter the job market and 
support herself in the style in which she 
had been living before the divorce See 
Jones v Jones, 700 P 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). 
The final factor to be considered is the 
ability of Dr Petersen to provide support 
This is the proper realm in which to consid 
er advanced degrees or professional hcens 
es An advanced degree is ordinarily an 
indicator of potential future earnings In 
addition, the attainment of a degree by one 
spouse often results in a disparity of in-
come that 23 likely tc last for n g ^ a t t^me, 
particularly in cases like the present one 
Dr Petersen has a history of earning more 
than $100,000 a year and Mrs Petersen has 
not worked for the past fifteen But it is 
the discrepancy in their earning power 
which is the basis for alimony, not the 
discrepancy in their educations There is 
no logical reason, for example, for treating 
differently a self-trained artist without for 
mal education who earns and will earn 
$100,000 a year and a doctor with a medical 
degree who earns and will earn $100,000 a 
year. Other things being equal, if such an 
artist divorces his or her spouse, he or she 
should pay alimony comparable to that paid 
by such a doctor Whether a spouse's abih-
5. It is clear the court viewed the payments to 
Mrs, Petersen, both those it specifically called 
alimony and the additional $1,000 monthly pay 
ments, as appropnate for her support It uti 
hzed the "property" label in characterizing some 
of the monthly total as a means to preclude 
terminauon of the payments to Mrs Petersen 
upon her remarriage Although the court pro-
vided that the $1,000 per month payments not 
called alimony would terminate in ten years, 
nothing in the court's findings establishes any 
particular significance to that point in time 
We accordingly see no basis, now that the entire 
monthly payment is properly characterized as 
alimony, to require that half of the $2,000 
monthly total automatically arid arbitrarily tcr 
minate at the end of ten years Cf Olson v 
Olson, 704 P2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985) (court 
ty to provide support is the result of an 
advanced degree or professional license is 
irrelevant to the analysis The key is the 
spouse's ability 
In Savage v Savage, 658 P 2d 1201 (Utah 
1983), the Supreme Court explained 
Where a marriage is of long duration and 
the earning capacity of one spouse great 
ly exceeds that of the other, as here, it is 
appropnate to order alimony and child 
support at a level which will insure that 
the supported spouse and children may 
maintain a standard of living not unduly 
disproportionate to that which they 
would have enjoyed had the marriage 
continued 
658 P 2d at 1205 See Jeppson v Jeppson, 
684 P2d 69 <Utah 1984) 
In Saiage, the parties had enjoyed a high 
standard of living during the marriage and 
the court upheld an award of $2,000 per 
month alimonv and child support ot $500 
per month per child 658 P 2d at 1205 In 
Yelderman v Yelderman, 669 P 2d 406 
(Utah 1983), the Supreme Court upheld an 
alimony award of $2,500 per month as not 
excessive 669 P 2d at 409 We agree that 
$2,000 per month alimony to Mrs Petersen 
is sufficient to help her maintain a stan 
dard of living not unduly disproportionate 
to that which she would have enjoyed if the 
marriage had continued 5 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to 
District Court to amend the decree to pro-
vide that Mrs Petersen receive $2,000 per 
month alimony and, correspondingly, to de-
lete the $120,000 cash award The decree 
modified divorce decree to delete provision that 
alimony would terminate after two years where 
monthly amount was reasonable but two-year 
limit was not) Of course, it would be proper 
for the district court to readjust the amount of 
alimony awarded to Mrs Petersen if at any 
point in time there develops a material change 
of circumstances, such as Mrs Petersen seem-
ing gainful employment or if Dr Petersen s sala 
ry drops dramatically through no fault of his 
own See, eg , Naylor v Naylor, 700 P 2d 707, 
710 (Utah 1985), Haslam v Haslam, 657 P 2d 
757, 758 (Utah 1982) The district court retains 
continuing jurisdiction in divorce actions to 
amend alimony Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5 
(1986) In addition the alimony awarded to 
Mrs Petersen automatically terminates under 
certain circumstances Id 
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is otherwise affirmed. Each party shall 
bear his or her own costs of appeal. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ.f concur. 
(o |tlYHUM8t«SYSHM> 
Dawn W. HORNE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
W. Reid HORNE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860060-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 18, 1987. 
The 3rd District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered nunc 
pro tunc order distributing property inci-
dent to previously granted divorce. Ex-
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that: (1) statute commit-
ting broad discretion to trial courts in 
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic 
relations matters was not limited in scope 
to cases involving marital status of the 
parties; (2) statute eliminated the common-
law requirement of previously made final 
order; and (3) good cause did not exist for 
entry of the order nunc pro tunc. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Courts <*^ 114 
The court has the power to act nunc 
pro tunc—to do act upon one date and 
make it effective as of prior date; the 
common-law power of nunc pro tunc allows 
the court to correct errors or supply omis-
sions to permit the record to accurately 
reflect that which in fact took place. U.C. 
A.1953, 3(Ma-l . 
2. Statutes «=»189 
In construing legislative enactments, 
the reviewing court assumes that each 
term in the statute was used advisedly, and 
thus, interprets and applies the statute ac-
cording to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
3. Divorce <3=>254(1) 
Statute committing broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic relations was not limited 
in scope to cases involving marital status of 
the parties, but could also apply to proper-
ty division problems; by its wording, the 
statute applies to any and all matters relat-
ing to divorce proceedings. U.C.A.1953, 
3(Ma- l . 
4. Statutes «=>222, 239 
Statutes are not to be construed as 
effecting any change in the common law 
beyond that which is clearly indicated; 
however, where statute is in derogation of 
the common law, and is also remedial in 
nature, the remedial application should be 
construed so as to give effect to its pur-
pose. 
5. Divorce <£=>162 
Statute committing broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic relations matters eliminat-
ed the common-law nunc pro tunc require-
ment of previously made final order; literal 
reading of statute indicated legislative in-
tent to change standard for entry of nunc 
pro tunc orders in domestic proceedings 
from requiring previously made final order 
as delineated by common law to requiring 
finding of "good cause," and legislative 
history indicated that statute was remedial 
in nature; Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 
(Utah), superseded by statute. U.C.A.1953, 
3(Ma- l . 
6. Divorce «=254(1) 
"Good cause" did not exist to enter 
nunc pro tunc order distributing property 
incident to previously granted divorce; 
agreement between parties expressly stat-
ed that property was to be transferred to 
equalize the marital assets in order to in-
sure that the transfer of property would 
not be taxable event, and in entering order 
prior to effective date of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 and without the essential and 
APPENDIX 3 
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ry intent is clearly revealed in the words he 
wrote Since every required statutory ele 
ment was expressed in his handwriting, no 
sound purpose or policy was served by 
invalidating Fitzgerald's holographic will 
See Estate of Black, 30 Cal 3d 880, 889, 641 
P 2d 754, 759, 181 Cal Rptr 222, 227 (1982) 
The will with two dates is facially ambigu-
ous about whether it was executed before 
or on the same date as the single-dated 
will However, the terms of the twice-dat 
ed will do not conflict with the other will's 
terms These consistent provisions must 
be considered valid Utah Code Ann 
§ 75-2-503 (1978) 
The holographic wills should have been 
admitted to probate The order of the trial 
court appointing Kenneth Fitzgerald as the 
personal representative of decedent is va 
cated, and the case is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this decision No 
costs are awarded 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ , concur 
Catherine RAYBURN, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Robert L RAYBURN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860022-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
May 29, 1987 
Action was brought for divorce The 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Dean E Conder, J , entered di 
vorce decree, and husband appealed The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J , held that (1) 
installment payments to account for hus 
band's medical degree could not be sus 
tamed as property settlement, but pay 
ments could be properly affirmed as tempo-
rary alimony, and (2) award to wife of 
one-half interest in husband's retirement 
fund was not abuse of discretion 
Affirmed as modified 
1. Divorce «=>237. 252.3(1) 
Advanced degree or professional h 
cense is not marital property subject to 
division upon divorce, but an advanced de-
gree often accompanies disparity in earning 
potential that is appropriately considered 
as factor in alimony analysis 
2. Divorce <S=>247, 252.3(1) 
Cash settlement of $45,000, payable in 
monthly installments of $750, could not be 
sustained as property settlement, in that 
value represented compensation for hus 
band's professional degree but payments 
could be properly affirmed as temporary 
alimony, given wife's needs and husband s 
ability to provide support 
3 Divorce <s=>247 
Award to wife of one half irtere^t in 
present value of husband's retirement 
fund, payable over five years with interest 
was not abuse of discretion in that fund 
was asset accumulated during marriage 
and especially where court permitted pav 
ments to be treated as "alimony for tax 
purposes 
Gaylen S Young, Jr , Salt Lake City for 
defendant and appellant 
B L Dart, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent 
Before ORME, BENCH and 
JACKSON, JJ 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge 
In this divorce action, defendant Robert 
L Rayburn appeals the valuation and dis 
tnbution of a retirement plan and an award 
of a $45,000 property settlement to offset 
his medical degree We affirm the trial 
court's basic disposition, but require 
amendment of the decree insofar as the 
$45,000 award is concen ec 
RAYBURN v. 
Cite M 738 PJ26 238 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Catherine Rayburn and Dr. 
Rayburn were married in Florida on June 
20, 1972. Earlier that same day, Dr. Ray-
burn had obtained his medical degree from 
the University of Florida. At the time, 
Mrs. Rayburn had a masters degree in 
jgology and was employed as a research 
associate at the University of Florida. The 
couple moved to Houston, Texas where Dr. 
Raybum completed a one year internship 
at Baylor University. Dr. Rayburn earned 
$8,000 to $9,000 during the internship. 
Mrs. Raybum also worked during that 
year, earning approximately $7,200. The 
couple returned to Florida where Dr. Ray-
bum completed a three-year residency, 
earning approximately $11,000 to $13,500 
per year. Mrs. Rayburn worked for a 
short time in Florida, but upon the birth of 
their first child, she stopped working full-
time and worked only occasionally, and on 
a part-time basis, throughout the rest of 
the marriage. 
After the residency, the family moved to 
San Antonio, where Dr. Rayburn completed 
two years of military service. During the 
five-year period of the internship, the resi-
dency, and his military service, Dr. Ray-
turn acted as the primary financial provid-
er for the family. Mrs. Rayburn stayed at 
Jjome, for the most part, to raise their 
Tentual three children. 
After military service, the family moved 
)vSalt Lake City where Dr. Rayburn joined 
tte staff of the Primary Children's Medical 
Center as a pediatric-anesthesiologist. In 
October 1982, Mrs. Rayburn filed for a 
divorce. 
Ifrrial was held on July 18 and 19, 1983. 
At the time of trial, Dr. Rayburn was earn-
jBg approximately $125,000 a year. After 
e two day trial, the court issued a memo-
idum decision. In the decision, the court 
rmined to award custody of the three 
or children, ages 9, 5, and 2, to Mrs. 
iyburn and to order Dr. Rayburn to pay 
id support in the amount of $400 per 
id per month. Apparently overlooking 
^J exact sequence of events on the Ray-
gUrns' wedding day, the court found the 
J&sband's medical degree to be a marital 
RAYBURN Utah 2 3 9 
(UtahApp. 1987) 
asset and ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay Mrs. 
Rayburn $45,000, payable at $750 a month, 
as her share of the asset and to "maintain 
her lifestyle for a period of adjustment." 
The decision would have awarded Dr. Ray-
burn all of his retirement fund. 
About two weeks later, the court issued 
a supplemental decision in which the court 
altered its earlier decision on the retire-
ment plan. The court, "in order to make a 
more equitable division of property/* or-
dered Dr. Rayburn to pay one-half the net 
present value of the retirement plan, $56,-
850, to Mrs. Rayburn in five annual install-
ments of $11,370 plus interest. The court 
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and a decree on September 15, 1983. 
The decree expressly awarded no alimony 
and set December 15, 1983. as the effective 
date of the divorce. 
Dr. Rayburn promptly filed a motion for 
relief from judgment or for a new trial. 
Dr. Rayburn claimed the trial court failed 
to consider the drastic tax consequences of 
placing a present value on the retirement 
plan and awarding half of that to his wife. 
The court took Dr. Rayburn's motion under 
advisement. On December 9, 1983, the 
court issued another memorandum deci-
sion. This decision provided for amend-
ment of the decree in such terms as would 
permit the five retirement plan payments 
to be treated as alimony for tax purposes. 
The court entered a second set of findings, 
conclusions, and decree on February 28, 
1984. The second decree again awarded no 
alimony as such, made the embellishment 
for tax purposes, and set February 28 as 
the effective date of the divorce. Dr. Ray-
burn retained new counsel, who filed a 
motion for relief from the new judgment or 
a new trial. The court denied the motion 
and Dr. Rayburn appealed. 
On appeal, Dr. Rayburn claims the court 
erroneously placed a high value on the 
retirement plan without considering the tax 
consequences. Dr. Rayburn also claims 
the court erred in finding the medical de-
gree to be a marital asset and placing a 
value on it without any supporting evi-
dence. 
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RECORD ON APPEAL 
Dr Rayburn ordered a transcript on ap-
peal of only 30 pages, representing a tiny 
fraction of the testimony offered at trial 
Under Rule ll(eX2) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals and the predecessor 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "If the 
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or 
is contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of 
all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion " Since the transcript provided 
by the appellant is insufficient to allow a 
review of the evidence to determine the 
propnetv of the findings, this court accepts 
the trial court's Findings of Fact as true ! 
and only evaluates the legal correctness of 
the two disputed dispositions2 As indi 
cated, the disputes concern the $45 000 
property settlement reflecting Mrs Rav 
bum's "share" of her husband's medical 
degree and the payments for Mrs Ray 
burn's one half interest in the present val 
ue of the doctor's retirement plan 3 
THE MEDICAL DEGREE 
[1] Recently this court held that an ad 
vanced degree or professional license is not 
marital propertv subject to division upon 
1 See Sawyers v Sawyers 558 P2d 607 608 
(Utah 1976) ("Appellate review of factual mat 
tcrs can be meaningful orderly and intelligent 
only in juxtaposition to a record by v*hich lower 
courts ruling and decisions on disputes can be 
measured ") In Sawyers, the Supreme Court 
presumed the findings of the trial court to have 
been supported by admissible competent sub 
stantial evidence Id. See Mitchell v Mitchell 
527 P2d 1359. 1360-61 (Utah 1974) 
2. At oral argument Dr Rayburn advised he did 
not really intend to question the findings in 
view of the evidence only the propriety of the 
disposition in view of the findings 
3 On appeal, Dr Rayburn also argues that the 
trial court erred in filing two separate Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and two sepa 
rate decrees with different effective dales In 
this regard he relics heavily on the failure of the 
second batch of documents to employ the term 
amended,** contending confusion will result 
about which decree controls The second set of 
findings, conclusions, and decree was of course 
prompted by Dr Rayburn s motion for relief 
from judgment Although not expressly labeled 
as "amended the second set of findings con 
divorce Petersen v Petersen, 737 P 2d 
237 (Utah App 1987) However, an ad-
vanced degree often accompanies a dispari-
ty in earning potential that is appropnately 
considered as a factor in alimony analysis 
See id., 243 We reaffirm our holding m 
Petersen and analyze the instant appeal 
"under the same analysis employed in that 
case. 
[2] The cash settlement of $45,000 pay 
able in monthly installments of $750 cannot 
be sustained under Petersen as a property 
settlement, but payments of $750 per 
month for a five-year period are properly 
affirmed as alimony 4 Criteria considered 
in determining a reasonable award of sup-
port must include the financial conditions 
and needs of the spouse in need of support 
*he ability of that spudbe to produce buffi 
dent income for his or her own support, 
and the ability of the other spouse to pro-
vide support Jones i Jones, 700 P 2d 
1072 1075 (Utah 1985) See Paffel v Paf 
fel 732 P 2d 96, 100-101 (Utah 1986) (fail 
ure to consider these three factors consti 
tutes an abuse of discretion) AJ1 hough 
characterizing the monthly payments as a 
property settlement, the trial court ex 
elusions and decree clearly supercedes lhe first 
set and are the direct subject of this appeal 
4 The trial court quite clearly viewed those pay 
ments as necessary for support but utilized the 
property settlement label as a means to preclude 
their termination should Mrs Rayburn remar 
ry While it is true that with alimony the re 
ceivmg spouse may lose some of his or her 
award through certain changed circumstances 
like remarriage Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5 
(1986) it is noted that with installments on a 
property award the receiving spouse might lose 
some of the award if the paying spouse obtained 
a discharge in bankruptcy By contrast an ah 
mony obligation would survive bankruptcy H 
U S C A § 523(a)(5) (West Supp 1987) Charac 
tenzation of required future payment, as in 
satisfaction of a marital property disposition 
rather than as alimony is not always in ihe best 
interest of the receiving spouse Cf Beckmann 
v Beckmann 685 P 2d 1045 1050 (Utah 1984) 
(The fact that an instrument is labeled property 
settlement agreement docs not necessarily de 
termine whether debt is dischargeable Court 
will look at underlying nature of the debt m 
eluding whether spouse would be imdequately 
supported without the property settlement ) 
RAYBURN v. RAYBURN 
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njessly found factors that readily meet the his medical degree before the parties were 
cntena listed in Jones J A h L " - L w"~ n~ L ' J 
As for Mrs Rayburn s need for support 
gnd her ability to produce sufficient in 
come, the trial court found that Mrs Rav 
burn was presently unemployed but that 
she had been employed and was well-edu 
cated, having acquired bachelor's and mas 
tar's degrees However, with minor chil 
dren residing at home and not yet in school, 
Mrs Rayburn was reluctant to return lm 
mediately to the full time workforce In 
addition, the court accepted Mrs Ray burn's 
testimony that in order to bring her em-
ployment skills to a satisfactory level, she 
needed to return to school and obtain fur 
ther education "to complement her current 
education " 5 As for Dr Rayburn's ability 
to provide support the trial court found 
that Dr Rayburn was well educated hav 
ing obtained an M D degree and that he 
had a successful practice as a pediatric an 
esthesiologist, earning a projected $125 000 
for 1983 
In its first memorandum decision the 
trial court characterized the monthlv pa\ 
ments for Mrs Rayburn as necessar) to 
maintain her life style for a period of ad 
justment" The 5-year period correspond 
ed to the amount of time it would take for 
Mrs Raybuni to complete her idditional 
education on a part time basis and until the 
parties' youngest child was in school all 
day* 
We acknowledge that there will be situa 
tons where an award of non terminable 
rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony 
*<Wlkl be appropriate See Petersen v Pet 
«pen, 737 P 2d at 242 n 4 However, this 
It not such a case Dr Rayburn acquired 
**ijThis additional education was apparently in 
* we field of computer science No doubt com 
1 P'tfenzation has mushroomed in importance in 
x *^°8y . as in nearly every area of scientific 
5^€adcav°r. during the decade Mrs Rayburn was 
^ttemployed Computer literacy would greatly 
^jjjjance Mrs Rayburn s ability to obtain suit 
f ^ r employment 
k™J rational basis for limiting the payments 
five-year period of adjustment distinguishes 
,
c a s c
 "Om Petersen where we declined to 
't a ten year cap on alimony otherwise 
where there was no articulated basis for 
tlcally diminishing the award upon the 
married Although Mrs Ravburn worked 
periodically during the marriage she did 
«ot endure substantial financial sacrifices' 
or defer her own education to help him 
obtain the degree In addition Mrs Ra> 
burn shared the financial rewards permit 
ted by her husband s advanced degree for 
several years Those rewards also resulted 
in the accumulation of considerable real 
and personal propertv during their mar-
riage, which was equitably divided upon 
their divorce The awird of temporary all 
mony, at $750 per month for a maximum of 
five years" adequately meets Mrs Ray 
burn's support needs and is readil) sustain 
able under the criteria outlined in Jones 
THE RETIREMENT PLAN 
[3] Dr Ravburn s retirement fund was 
one of the valuable assets accumulated 
during the marriage and w*s of course 
subject to equitable division upon divorce 
Wooduard i Wooduard 656 P 2d 431 433 
(litan 19o2; Sti zrigitrt t Enyttrt 576 
P2d 1274 1276 (l iuh 197b) We accept 
the trial court s finding that the retirement 
funds present value was $113 700 In its 
second memorandum decision the trial 
court explained that it had considered sev 
tral wa\s to distribute the wifes share of 
the retirement fund ind found fixing a sum 
equal to one half of the prtstnt value md 
distributing that to Mrs Ravburn as a cash 
award to be the most equitable By requir 
ing Mrs Rayburn s share in the retirement 
fund to be cashed out following divorce, 
the court avoided leaving the parties in a 
financial entanglement that would contin 
ue for approximately twentv or thirty 
years and would probably result in further 
elapse of ten years See Petersen v Petersen 
111 P 2d at 243 n 5 See also Olson v Olson 
704 P2d 564 567 (Utih 1985) 
7 The alimony obligation could terminate carli 
cr under certain circumstances Utah Code 
Ann § 30-3-5 (1986) In addition the district 
court has continuing jurisdiction to change 
the alimony award as is reasonable and neces 
sary id (3) provided there develops a substan 
tial change in the ptitics circumstances See 
eg Naylor v Mavlor 700 P 2d 707 710 (Utah 
1985) 
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court hearings and cause future animosity 
between the parties " 
However, the court went on to explain 
that "to require the defendant to pay the 
full sum at one time would have been an 
extra burden " By allowing Dr Rayburn 
to make five annual payments, the court 
left him the option of paying his obligation 
out of current income or on some other 
basis, rather than having to liquidate the 
fund or sell other assets The court addi-
tionally softened the impact by ultimately 
allowing the payments to be characterized 
in such terms as would permit them to be 
treated as 'alimony" for tax purposes8 
There is admittedly some potential for 
confusion because of the measures taken 
by the trial court to massage the tax treat 
ment of the payments to Mrs Rayburn 
However, these measures were the trial 
court's response to Dr Rayburn s very 
own argument that the payments worked a 
financial hardship on him The trial court 
allowed the payments to be considered 'ah 
mony" for tax purposes in order to give Dr 
Rayburn the tax break of the alimony de 
duction while at the same time permitting 
Mrs Rayburn to be cashed out within a 
few years On appellate review, the trial 
court's apportionment of property will not 
be disturbed unless it works such a mam 
fest injustice or inequity as to indicate a 
clear abuse of discretion Eg, Turner v 
Turner, 649 P 2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982) We 
find no abuse of discretion in the court's 
awarding Mrs Rayburn a one-half interest 
in the retirement fund, payable over five 
years with interest On the contrary, and 
especially with the refinements which were 
made to address Dr Raybum's concerns 
about taxes, the trial court's approach was 
clearly fair and equitable 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the 
district court to amend the decree to pro-
vide that Mrs Rayburn receive $750 per 
month alimony for five years and, corre 
8 The trial court did not stop here in tailoring 
the provision to make it as painless to Dr Ray 
burn as possible under the circumstances The 
court stated in its Conclusions of Law "In the 
event that the payments under this paragraph 
do not qualify as alimony for tax purposes, this 
would constitute a change of circumstances en 
spondmgly, to delete the $45,000 cash 
award The decree is otherwise affirmed 
Each party shall bear his or her own costs 
of appeal 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ , concur 
O I KDNUM8CR SYSTEM 
SCIENTIFIC ACADEMY OF HAIR DE-
SIGN, INC., a Utah corporation, dba 
Mediterranean Hair Academy, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v 
Robert 0 BOWEN, in his official capaci-
ty as director of the Division of Regis-
tration within the Department of Busi-
ness Regulation, a Department of the 
Government of the State of Utah, De-
fendant and Respondent 
No 86003S-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
June 8, 1987 
Administrative suspension of license to 
operate a cosmetology/barbenng school 
was affirmed by order of the District 
Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County, James S Sawaya, J , and school 
appealed The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
J , held that (1) the Court of Appeals had 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but (2) the 
findings in support of the suspension were 
not contrary to a clear preponderance of 
the evidence, even assuming such standard 
rather than the "arbitrary and capricious 
standard was applicable 
Affirmed 
titling the defendant to come back before the 
Court and obtain a modification reducing th>s 
payment to the extent of the income tax uhicn 
he is required to pay because of an inability to 
take a deduction of these payments as alimo-
ny 
APPENDIX 4 
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a somewhat similar instruction was harm-
less error. Furthermore, the property sto-
len was not fungible property which de-
fendant might have legitimately possessed. 
Rather, the checks were identified as prop-
erty belonging to others were shown to 
have been forged and would not legitimate-
ly have been in his possession under any 
circumstances. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., concurs. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring 
separately): 
I concur in the majority opinion, but 
write separately to emphasize the obli-
gation of defense counsel to notify judges 
who have ruled on pretrial suppression is-
sues that defendants' objections to chal-
lengea evidence are reserved and not with 
drawn, in us alerting those judges to the 
possibility that trial evidence may affect 
the validity of earlier rulings I agree that 
in this ca^e there was an extensive hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress, and it is 
quite clear from the record that defense 
counsel did not intend to waive any related 
evidentiary objections at trial In fact, sev 
eral ambiguous references during trial to a 
"prior motion" may have referred to de 
fendant's pretrial motion to suppress It is 
important, however, that trial judges be 
given the opportunity to review pretrial 
suppression rulings when and if there is 
any likelihood that they were erroneous 
When the pretrial judge is also the trial 
judge, unlike the circumstance in Statt v 
Lesley, 672 P 2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), this is 
easily accomplished by indicating on the 
record, either at the end of the pretrial 
hearing or at the trial outside the presence 
of the jury, that there is a continuing objec 
tion to the evidence challenged in the mo 
tion to suppress 
HOWE, and ZIMMERMAN JJ , 
concur in the concurring opinion of 
DURHAM, J 
Betty M. GARDNER, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
William James GARDNER, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 19246. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan 4, 1988. 
Divorce decree was entered by the Sec-
ond District Court, Weber County, Ronald 
0 Hyde, J , and wife appealed The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, Associate CJ., held 
that (1) trial court was required to value 
husband's retirement account, (2) w f p w ^ 
entitled to findings :r. support of denial of 
her request for portion of husband's medi-
cal assets, (3) regardless of whether evalu-
ation and distribution of a professional de-
gree or professional practice is ever appro-
priate, it was inappropriate in the present 
case where marriage *a> of long duration 
and present earnings and business assets 
provided a more accurate measure of the 
true worth of wife's investment in hus-
band's degree, and (4) alimony auard was 
insufficient and inequitable 
Reversed and remanded 
Howe, J , filed opinion concurring and 
du>senting. 
1. Divorce e=286<3) 
Though the Supreme Court may modi-
f\ decisions of trial tourt trial court's ap-
portionment of marital properU vull not be 
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion 
2. Divorce <£=252 3<l) 
Marital property includes pension fund 
or insurance but dividing retirement or 
pension funds is not necessanlv consistent 
with principles of equitable distribution in 
all cases, and providing for pavments when 
GARDNER v. GARDNER 
Cheat 744 ?24 1076 (Vtmh 198*) 
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payout begins should be employed only in 
rare instances. 
3. Divorce <£=252.3<4) 
Trial court, in apportioning marital 
property upon divorce, was required to at 
least consider the value of the husband's 
retirement account, and alternatives avail-
able for taking that value into account 
would include requiring husband to pay 
half of net present value to wife in annual 
installments, or reapportioning property 
distribution to offset that value 
4. Divorce <S=>253(4) 
Wife was entitled to finding in support 
of denial of her request for a portion of the 
assets of husband's medical assets, and it 
was error to refuse to place present value 
thereon on the ground that the assets were 
futuristic 
5 Divorce €=>252 3(1) 
Goodwill is properly subject to eq 
uitable distribution upon divorce 
6 Divorce <S=>252.3(1) 
Regardless of whether professional de 
gree and professional practice mav in ap 
propriate cases constitute marital property 
subject to evaluation and distribution upon 
divorce wifes request for property inter 
est in husband's medical degree was map 
propriate where the marriage was of long 
duration and present earnings and business 
assets provided a more accurate measure 
of the true worth of the wife's investment 
in her husband's degree 
7. Divorce e=>237 
Alimony award should, after marriage 
of long duration and to the extent possible 
equalize the parties respective standards 
of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage 
S Divorce c=210(2) 
Ahmonv award of $1 200 per month 
until husband's retirement and $600 per 
month thereafter was an abuse of discre 
tion where husband was a physician with 
earnings of $6,000 per month wife had not 
been employed for ,J0 vears husband had 
substantial retirement assets, and wife 
would qualify for social security payments 
only as an "ex-wife married over 20 years " 
9. Divorce «=»225 
There was no error in divorce case in 
failing to award attorney fees to wife, 
where portion of property award was for 
purpose of assisting wife to pay attorney 
and no showing was made in trial as to the 
nature and amount of fees 
Pete N Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
C Gerald Parker, Ogden, for defendant 
and respondent 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice 
Plaintiff Betty Gardner appeals from a 
decree awarding alimony and attorney fees 
in a divorce action she brought against her 
former husband, William Gardner We re 
verse and remand for further considera 
tion 
Mr and Mrs Gardner were married at 
Steels Tavern, Virginia, on April 17, 1950 
No children were born to them but the 
couple adopted two children who are now 
both adults Earlv in the marriage Mrs 
Gardner worked full time as a secretarv 
while Mr Gardner completed his medical 
training Mr Gardner also worked various 
jobs, and his parents provided support in 
the form of medical school tuition Mrs 
Gardner has not worked since 1958 when 
Mr Gardner completed his medical train 
ing Mr Gardner is now employed as a 
general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month 
While married Mr and Mrs Gardner 
acquired substantial real and personal 
property Their major asset was a farm 
including a home and equipment located 
near Eden Ltah worth between $246 000 
and $280 000 Other assets included Mr 
Gardners mMJi<al assets and retirement 
funds with in unctrtam valuation of be 
tween $11 000 and $177 000, a contract for 
the sale of stock in the Ogden Clinic Invest 
merit Gompanv a certificate of deposit, 
household furniture, furnishings and fix 
tures, boats and automobiles sporting 
equipment, and two horses and associated 
equipment At the time of divorce the 
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couple's only outstanding debts were a 
first mortgage on the family home and a 
loan for the purchase of one automobile. 
The trial court ordered that the farm, 
home, and equipment be sold and the pro-
ceeds be divided equally Until the farm 
was sold, Mrs Gardner was entitled to its 
use, although she had to pay the mortgage, 
taxes, and insurance. The court also or-
dered that the motor vehicles and boats be 
sold and the proceeds divided equally, with 
the exception of one personal automobile 
for each party The household furnishings 
and other items of personal property were 
divided roughly equally, according to per-
sonal need Mr Gardner was awarded his 
medical and business assets, including re-
tirement funds, except Mrs Gardner was 
awarded one third of the proceeds from the 
sate of Che Old Ogdeci Chmc budding to pay 
her attorne> fees They were to share 
equally a monev market certificate The 
^ourt granted Mrs Gardner $l,20u per 
month alimony, to be reduced to $G00 per 
month following Mr Gardner's retirement 
Mrs Gardner was also to have a claim for 
$50,000 against Mr Gardner's estate in the 
event that he predeceased her 
Mrs Gardner asks this Court to reverse 
the judgment of the lower court She cites 
Wooduatd i Woodward, 656 P 2d 431 
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that she 
has a spousal right to an equitable dihtnbu-
tion of Mr Gardner's retirement funds 
She also asserts a property interest in his 
medical degree and business and claims 
that the alimony award was insufficient 
Finally, she asks this Court for an award of 
attorney fees 
JJJ J;; J Jjvo/ve procevdjng, the LnaJ 
court should make a distribution of proper 
tv and income so that the parties may 
readjust their lives to their new circum 
stances as w< II as possiblt Turner i 
hutttf <>n PJd h (l,Uh IW2). Mm 
Donald r MacDonald 120 Utah 57,*, <Mb 
P h\ 1066 <19">1) Although this Court ma\ 
modify decisions of the trial court, its ap 
portionment of marital propertv will not be 
disturbed unless it is < learlv unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion Turner 649 
P2d at * 
The trial court awarded Mr, ^trftMim--
retirement account and medical^^Hl 
without placing a present value on^raSj 
those assets The trial court «^ fleOTHJ5c 
those types of assets "futuristic** W ^ M t 
rated that their value would be'utiEttiw 
retirement The court did not attemjwM 
resolve the differing valuations of th£?£c 
sets and provided little explanation fonQU 
award to Mr Gardner % K ^ 
Recently, in Acton v Delimit, 737 pjjj 
996, 999 (Utah 1987), we noted: * *'•* 
Failure of the trial court to make fiSjl 
ings on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment" Kmkella v Baugh, 660 
P 2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) The find-
ings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree "follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence" 
Smith v Smith, 726 P 2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986) The findings "should be suffi-
ciently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached" Rucker [v. 
Dalton], 598 P 2d [1336] at 1338 [Utah 
1979J Sec aLso Mountain States Legal 
Foundation v Public Sennce Commis-
sion, 636 P2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981) 
The trial court's statement in its findings 
that the retirement account and Mr Gard-
ner's medical assets are futuristic" was 
apparently intended to mean that they 
could not be given a present value or 
should not for other reasons be taken into 
account That however, does not follow 
from the evidence presented at trial, nor is 
it supported bv our cases Regardless of 
how remote the full value of an asset is, it 
still has present value The testimony ad-
duced at trial d» voted t<> differing valua* 
(ions b\ tht partes IIH nU d more precise 
findings 
|21 In Wooduard i Wooduatd, 656 
I1 2d at 4 \l we recognized that retirement 
benefits whether vested or not are a form 
<>f deferred composition whith a court 
should at least consider when dividing mar-
ital assets \ right to deferred compensa-
GARDNER v. GARDNER 
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tion acquired during marriage, or that por- accomplished when necessary 
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tion of one's right to deferred compensa-
tion acquired during marriage, should not 
be entirely ignored in dividing assets, irre-
spective of when the vested funds are pay-
able. Thus, marital property "encompass-
es all of the assets of every nature pos-
sessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
this includes any such pension fund or in-
surance." Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 
1274 (Utah 1978). 
However, an award of a part of a 
spouse's retirement funds may create sig-
nificant problems. In some instances, mar-
ital assets are sparse, income is low, and an 
award of an equitable share of retirement 
assets might work a substantial hardship. 
Courts have, however, awarded the value 
of the assets on a periodic payment plan 
'and, in some instances, have provided for 
payments when payout begins. This alter-
native should be employed only in rare 
instances. In Woodward, the Court stated: 
Long term <mu deferred sharing ot finan-
cial interests are obviously too suscepti-
ble to continued strife and hostility, cir-
cumstances which our courts traditional-
ly strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible. . . . 
. . . [VVJhere other assets for equitable 
distribution are inadequate or lacking al-
together, or where no present value can 
be established and the parties are unable 
to reach agreement, resort must be had 
to a form of deferred distribution based 
upon fixed percentages. 
656 P.2d at 433 (quoting Kikkert v. Kik-
kert. 111 N.J.Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76, 
7^-80 (1981)). 
Obviously, dividing retirement or pension 
funds is not necessarily consistent with 
principles of equitable distribution in all 
cases. The purpose of divorce is to end 
marriage and allow the parties to make as 
much of a clean break from each other as 
is reasonably possible. An award of de-
ferred compensation which ties a couple 
,together long after divorce can frustrate 
that objective. 
[3] Nevertheless, the division of retire-
ment funds between two persons can be 
For exam-
ple, in Rayburn v. Ray burn, 738 P.2d 238 
(Utah App.1987), a physician was required 
to pay one-half the net present value of his 
retirement plan, $56,850. to his former wife 
in five annual installments. The court 
awarded present value of the share to be 
paid within five years to avoid 'leaving the 
parties in a 'financial entanglement that 
would continue for approximately twenty 
or thirty years and would probably result 
in further court hearings and cause future 
animosity between the parties.'" Id. at 
241-42. Rayburn provides a possible al-
ternative for dealing with the value of the 
retirement account in this case. Because 
of the sizeable assets in this case, another 
alternative would be reapportionment of 
the property distribution to offset the value 
of the retirement account. 
In any event, it will be necessary on 
remand to determine the value of the re-
tirement account. The account has a 
present value of between $73,000 and 
$177,000, and the Court should at least 
consider the value of the account in making 
the property distribution. 
Another alternative for the apportion-
ment of property lies in the trial court's 
discretion to award the entire value of a 
solely owned professional corporation to 
the husband. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 
(Utah 1982). In Dogu. the earning power 
of the corporation resulted entirely from 
Dr. Dogu's continuing ability to work; 
however, there were questions as to his 
ability to do so. The trial court awarded 
the wife savings certificates, bank ac-
counts, and stock to offset the present liq-
uid assets of the corporation (accounts re-
ceivable and bank accounts). The trial 
court did not attempt to value the future 
earnings potential of the corporation, pre-
sumably because of questions regarding 
the ability of Dr. Dogu to continue to gen-
erate income for the corporation. 
[4,5] The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr. 
Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched 
institution, whose twenty-three members 
have banded together in a business orga-
nization. It is not likely to be highly sus-
ceptible to earnings interruptions because 
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of the ill health of one of its members. 
The Ogden Clinic is not entirely valueless. 
Mr. Gardner's share, using his own figures, 
is worth at least $3,826 (partnership $3,726, 
corporation $100). Mrs. Gardner's account-
ants value the business much higher. Nei-
ther gave consideration to the good will 
inherent in the professional clinic.1 Mrs. 
Gardner was entitled to findings in support 
of the denial of her request for a portion of 
those assets. Instead, the trial court dis-
posed of the medical assets in the same 
sentence in which it disposed of the retire-
ment account. 
The medical assets at issue here were not 
included in the retirement account, but the 
trial court seems to have assumed that 
they were one and the same. In any event, 
no findings of fact were made as to the 
value of the medical assets. The award to 
Mr. Gardner of his retirement funds and 
medical assets may be proper and eq-
uitable. However, we cannot adequately 
review the trial court's determinations on 
the basis of the sparse findings before us. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a 
valuation of the medical assets and retire-
ment accounts and reconsideration of the 
distribution of the marital property on the 
basis of those findings 
In addition, Mrs. Gardner assets an eq-
uitable and legal property interest in the 
medical degree of her former spouse. 
Whether professional degrees and profes-
sional practice constitute marital property 
subject to valuation and distribution upon 
the dissolution of a marriage has been the 
subject of much debate in recent years, 
especially in the wake of decisions where 
such a valuation has been made. See, e.g., 
Inman v. In man, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 
1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488, 
1. A marr iage mas IK- analo^i/ed to a partnei 
ship Upon dissolution oi the marital "pailner 
ship,' ' an equitable distribution should be based 
on eonsidei ation of all assets, not just those that 
s u r \ u e the trip to the bottom ol the balance 
sheet Where appropriate, value mav be given 
to that "something in business which gives rea 
vjnablc expectancy <>l preference in the race of 
competi t ion," commonlv known as good will 
Jackson i< Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d HI. 8S. 41 S P 2d 
667, 670 (1966) 
The ability of a business to generate income 
from its cont inued patronage is commonly re 
453 A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brie* 
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 NJEfc 
2d 712 (1985). It has similarly been thf 
subject of discussion in our Court of Apl 
peals. See Ray burn v. Ray burn, 738 P»2d 
238 (Utah App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen; 
737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.1987). 
One authority has argued that education-
al achievements are susceptible to valua-
tion,2 but there is judicial authority for the 
proposition that the value of an education 
does not fall within the common under-
standing of the concept of property: 
An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
"property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market. It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on 
death of the holder and is nor inheritable. 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money. It is Mmply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
m the future acquisition of property. In 
our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term. 
In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 
432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). See also Maho-
ney, 91 N.J. 488 at 4%, 453 A.2d 527 at 
531. 
The cases which have refused to hold 
that professional degree&-and practice con-
stitute marital property subject to valua-
tion and distribution have nonetheless as-
sessed and divided the value of the degree 
terred to as \HHKI will r,uod will is p i o p e r k 
subject to equitable dislnt>ution u|K>n d i v o u e 
.Vtr, <>K, Du^an \ Du^an. 92 \ J 423. 4S7 A 2d 
1 (1981), Matter »j Marriage of tfeee_e, 91 Wash 
2d 324, S88 f»2d I H6 (1979) Hut see Pie 
1 reatment of (,'<MHJ Will m Dtxnrce /^(needm^s, 
18 Fam I O 213 (1984) 
2. See Fit/patrick & I)ou< eile, Can the I conunuc 
Value of an Education Realh He Measured1. 21 
J.Fdin.l. Si (1983) 
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or practice on the basis of other legal and 
equitable remedies These cases follow a 
common fact pattern Typically, the hus 
band is supported throughout a long gradu 
ate or professional program by the working 
wife, and the couple is divorced soon after 
graduation In such cases, there are few 
mantaJ assets to distribute, and the courts 
have considered other ways of compensat-
ing the spouse In a limited number of 
cases, the courts focus on the educational 
degree or professional practice See gener-
ally In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 
N W 2d 885 (Iowa 1978), Mahoney, 91 N J 
488, 453 A 2d 527, Inman, 648 S W 2d 847, 
O'Brien, 66 N Y 2d 576, 498 N V S 2d 743. 
489 X E 2d 712, and Hubbard v Hubbard, 
603 P2d 747 (Okla 1979), for various theo-
ries of valuation 
[6J We agree that an educational or 
professional degree is difficult to value and 
that such a valuation does not easily fit the 
common understanding of the character of 
property However, at least in the present 
instance, we need not reach the question of 
whether such a valuation may ever take 
place. Sufficient assets distinguish this 
case from others in which equity and fair-
ness required another solution Where, as 
here, the marriage is of long duration, 
present earnings and business assets pro-
vide a more accurate measure of the true 
worth of the wife's investment in her hus-
band's degree. The home, farm, automo-
biles, and other assets of approximately 
$500,000 allow for a divisible award be-
tween the Gardners In a sense, Mrs. 
Gardner has realized benefits from the 
medical degree in the form of a greater 
property settlement and higher alimony 
We find Mrs. Gardner's request for a prop-
erty interest in Mr. Gardner's medical de-
gree inappropriate under these facts and 
affirm the findings of the trial court in this 
regard. 
[7, 8) Mrs Gardner also claims the trial 
court's award of alimony was insufficient 
and inequitable. We agree An alimony 
award should, after a marriage such as this 
and to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possi-
v. GARDNER
 TT L 
1076 {Vt*h !*«*) U t a h 1081 
ble to that standard <»f l 
i"K the
 marnaK e 1 ' f e n J ° y e d d u r 
1072, 1075 (Ijih 1 9 ' r ^ ™ > P 2 d 
-n .uj, .«1 (I , a h 1 9 8 3 ) j 
we enumerated threr f.,., 
fix.™ sn .i l c tor5' lmPortant in 
"xintf an alimony auard ill rhw. 
cond.tions and needs „ J , ' n a n C , a l 
ab.l.ty of the JZ to 1 " ^ <2) t h e 
mcomeforherse i n ^ r S U f f ' C , e n t 
the husband £ ^ L y " ' ' " * ^ ° f 
700 P2d at 1075 s T ^ " J°nes-
Mrs Gardner has n,*» u 
Ploved since 1 9 5 8 x 7 ? < P U n f u , , y ^ 
cated that h w a s 2 7 ? tCSt,m0"-V » * • 
regain these skills and h 
by contrast, retains his ,-> Gardner. 
- n with e a r m n ^ o T i r " 3 P h T The tr,al coun \^ZrG7^r 
award and stated hat h P r e r e t ' r e ™nt 
•nony f o l l o w i n g
 G ! r e d U C U ° n '" a l -
r e n e c t e d a d r o p m h ! p n e r S m , r e m e n t Vfr« r t . earning potential 
t a n H t n e ; S e " K l b l , , t y f o r s o - ' s e c u n 
ty. and the fact that the house would be 
s>old. providing Mrs c A 
a s s e t / We think That th ^ , , q U 'd 
abuse of d i s c r e t l th'S ^ W a S a " 
Mrs Gardner executed an »fr.A . 
to tnal feung her momM * P " 0 r 
R 7 0 0 per month T r t n / . ^ " 8 6 8 3 1 
ently relied on testimon "a 'ZVe^' 
and on a pnor affidavit
 w h c h " * " * 
monthly needs at $1,200 Mrs L H 
- t emp,oyed and has h t ^ p ^ -
bemg reemployed View,™ t, , 
Penses, however arrived •,, , , 
Mr Gardner's, we t h n t i t ? " 8 1 ^ ° f 
award » , n , u f f ^ „ t ^ ' L " C W ^ ^ 
Ues' standards of t ^ ™ *" ^ 
Similarly, the trial eonrt\, _, , 
- , „ , „ , .
 aUo mnJJb £«W. 
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tially. Mrs. Gardner, however, has no pen-
sion and will qualify for social security 
payments only as an "ex-wife married over 
20 years." She will not qualify for regular 
social security benefits until she has 
worked another thirty-nine quarters. Be-
cause the likelihood of her providing for 
her own retirement is small, we find that 
the trial court's award is insufficient to 
equalize the parties' standards of living 
following Mr. Gardner's retirement 
We reverse and remand for further pro-
ceedings in light of the above and in light 
of the factors enumerated in Jones, 700 
P.2d at 1075. On remand, the trial court 
must evaluate the wife's ability to support 
herself based on findings and conclusions 
under the standards stated in Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996. It is not clear from 
the record before us that Mrs. Gardner will 
be able to meet her monthly needs either 
before or after Mr. Gardner's retirement, 
and this is the focus of our concern. Our 
review of the record therefore indicates 
that the alimony award may have to be 
increased. However, explicit findings 
based on the factors in Jones are needed to 
support that conclusion. 
[9J Finally, Mrs. Gardner asks this 
Court to make an award of attorney fees. 
The trial court made no specific award of 
attorney fees. However, in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court 
made clear that an award of a one-third 
interest in the Old Ogden Clinic building 
account and the division of the money mar-
ket certificate was for the purpose of as-
sisting the wife to pay her attorney. Mr. 
Gardner correctly notes that a request for 
attorney fees must be accompanied by evi-
dence at trial as to the nature and amount 
of such fees. See Warren v. Warren, 655 
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982). No such show-
ing was made at trial, and the findings do 
not support Mrs. Gardner's request. Inso-
far as we have approved the property set-
tlement of the lower court, the award of 
attorney fees made part of that settlement 
is affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in the majority opinion exceptJM 
that part dealing with alimony. As toihSfj 
part, I dissent for the following reasot&p 
First, in reversing and remanding for^T 
valuation of the medical and retiremem 
assets and a redistribution of marital prop, 
erty on the basis of those findings, Mrs. 
Gardner's financial position will undoubted-
ly improve and her income increase. This 
increase will have a direct bearing on the 
amount of alimony which she should be 
awarded. It is premature for us to now 
hold that the $1,200 per month or the $600 
per month awarded by the trial court is 
inadequate. It may well be that after the 
redistribution of property is made, the 
amounts awarded will be entirely fair and 
could even be excessive. This is especially 
true as to $600 alimony after Mr. Gardner's 
retirement Any amount of his retirement 
awarded to her on remand decreases her 
need for alimony and his ability to pay i t 
The trial judge recognized this reality when 
he wrote in his memorandum decision: 
Upon his retirement, the alimony shall 
reduce to $600 per month. The reasons 
for this reduction are: by the time of 
retirement, the home should be sold and 
the plaintiff should have liquid assets; 
defendant's income will materially de-
crease; plaintiff will also receive some 
social security benefits. It is my intent 
in awarding to the defendant his medical 
assets and retirement assets that alimo-
ny shall be paid therefrom and that the 
plaintiff shall have a claim thereon as 
against the defendant's estate if he 
should predecease her. This claim shall 
be in the amount of $50,000. 
Second, the $l,700-per-month alimony re-
quested by Mrs. Gardner was based on her 
affidavit which listed her monthly needs at 
that amount, but based on her assumption 
that the court would allow her to continue 
to live on the twenty-one-acre country es-
tate of the parties on which is a six-bed-
room home with garages for four cars, a 
barn, and other outbuildings. Consequent-
ly, in arriving at her $I,700-per-month re-
quest, she included the monthly mortgage 
GARDNER 
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payment, the property taxes, insurance pre-
miums on that property, monthly utilities 
on that proj>erty, and amounts for the care 
of the farm animals and for farm, garden, 
and house maintenance and repairs. How-
ever, the trial court did not award her the 
country estate or allow her to permanently 
slay there, but ordered that the parties sell 
the property as soon as possible. The ma-
jority opinion does not assail this determi-
nation. The sale of the property ordered 
by the court necessarily eliminated many of 
the monthly excuses which formed a basis 
for the $1,700 alimony request. The trial 
court, therefore, acted properly in exclud-
ing those items of expense in determining a 
reasonable amount of monthly alimony and 
presumably included instead the cost of 
Mrs. Gardner's living in smaller and less 
expensive quarters. On cross-examination, 
Mrs. Gardner admitted that her cost of 
living would be less if she did not live on 
the estate. Thus, the $1,200 awarded by 
the trial court was clearly within the range 
of the evidence before the court The ma-
jority Jot%> not claim that $1,200 was 
"clearly erroneous" as rule 52, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, requires us to conclude 
before we may upset findings of fact by 
the trial court. 
We have always accorded trial courts 
considerable latitude in fixing alimony. 
Yet here, the majority sweeps aside the 
trial court's judgment because is only one-
fifth of Mr. Gardner's monthly income and 
is insufficient to "equalize the parties' stan-
dard of living." Insofar as this writer 
knows, reasonable and fair alimony has 
never been expressed as a percentage of 
the husband's monthly income. This is a 
new concept, completely foreign to the test 
recognized in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985), for determining an alimony 
award. Since the monthly income of di-
vorced husbands is not all the same, the 
Jtnonthly needs and financial conditions of 
divorced wives vary widely, and debts and 
Other factors have to be considered, per-
centages should not be employed or relied 
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position of the parties after their divorce. 
Again, this concept is contrary to the three 
factors to be considered which we enumer-
ated in Jones v. Jones, supra: (1) the finan-
cial condition and needs of the wife, (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself, and (3) the ability of the 
husband to provide support. We have said 
that the wife is entitled to enjoy as near as 
possible the same standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage and she 
should be prevented from becoming a pub-
lic charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 411 (Utah 1977). But this is not the 
same as "equalizing" their incomes. The 
instant case is a good example. Mr. Gard-
ner is a highly skilled surgeon earning 
$f>,000 per month. Mrs. Gardner was not 
employed at the time of the divorce. She 
thought she could maintain the standard of 
living to which she had become accustomed 
if she received $1,700 per month alimony. 
If their financial positions after divorce are 
to be equal, she presumably should have 
$2,000 per month aiimony. I do not think 
the majority intends that result. 
The object of divorce is to set the parties 
free of each other after an equitable divi-
sion of property is made and, if needed, an 
award of alimony is made which will enable 
both parties to maintain as near as possible 
the standard of living they enjoyed during 
the marriage. The parties then go their 
separate ways and attempt to rebuild their 
lives. But because of the disparity in their 
earning ability, the wife here, who has 
training as a secretary but has not been 
employed for thirty-three years, will never 
earn as much as her husband-surgeon. 
Our cases do not suggest that the divorce 
decree should attempt to cure this disparity 
by "equalizing" their future incomes. 
fo |«{VNUM8t« M U M 
Finally, I strongly dissent from the re-
sated references in the majority opinion 
a t alimony is to "equalize" the financial 
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press the disputed evidence. The officers 
in this case made no attempt to obtain a 
search warrant For the reasons discussed 
above, I do not think that the circumstanc-
es justified this failure. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of DURHAM, J. 
Kathryn Myrna NEWMEYER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Jeddy Paul NEWMEYER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 19183. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 13, 1987. 
Divorce was sought The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E. 
Banks, J., granted divorce, divided proper-
ty, awarded alimony, and awarded attorney 
fees to former wife. Former husband ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, 
J., held that (1) trial court properly credit-
ed wife with inheritances used to purchase 
homes and properly valued house; (2) wife 
was entitled to annual alimony of $1; and 
(3) wife failed to establish right to attorney 
fee award of $1,423. 
Affirmed, but attorney fee award 
stricken. 
Howe, J., concurred and filed opinion. 
Durham, J., concurred in part, dissent-
ed in part, and filed opinion. 
1. Divorce «=>252.5(1) 
Trial court properly exercised discre-
tion by crediting former wife with inheri-
tances used to purchase homes and by 
crediting former husband with equal share 
of appreciation of value in homes despite 
much lower contribution. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-5(1). 
2. Divorce <s=>252.3(3) 
Appropriate treatment of property 
brought into marriage by one party may 
vary from divorce case to divorce case; 
overriding consideration is that ultimate di-
vision be equitable—that property be fairly 
divided between parties, given contribu-
tions during marriage and circumstances at 
time of divorce. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(1). 
3. Divorce <s=>253(2) 
Evidence supported trial court's con-
clusion as to amount of money contributed 
by former wife from her inheritances to 
purchase homes and as to amount of for-
mer husband's contribution to purchase 
homes. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(1); Rules Civ. 
Proc., Rule 52(a). 
4. Divorce <s=>253(3) 
Evidence <s=*574 
Trial court dividing home upon divorce 
did not abus*» Hi^ cretior b,r re^ cctin0* expert 
appraisal of $122,000 and appraisal of 
$112,000 and by valuing house at $117,000. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(1). 
5. Pleading <3=>427 
Question as to whether former wife or 
former husband was entitled to tax deduc-
tion for child was tried by parties without 
objection and could be decided by trial 
court awarding deduction to wife, even 
though her initial prayer for relief consent-
ed to husband's use of deduction. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 15(b). 
6. Divorce «=»252.3(1) 
Amount of alimony awarded after di-
vorce and relative earning capabilities of 
parties are relevant to determine equitable 
division of marital assets. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-5(1). 
7. Divorce <s=»237 
Alimony is to be awarded after consid-
eration of three factors: receiving spouse's 
financial condition and needs; receiving 
spouse's ability to earn adequate income; 
and providing spouse's ability to provide 
support 
NEWMEYER 
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8. Divorce <s»2l<)<2) 
Former wife was entitled to annual 
alimony of $1, even though former wife 
received majority of assets of marriage and 
was working at time of divorce; wife had 
worked only episodically at low-paying jobs 
during two decades of marriage and did not 
have opportunity to build retirement fund 
9. Divorce 0=227(1) 
Former wife failed to provide suffi-
cient evidence to demonstrate that award 
of $1,423 in attorney fees was reasonable; 
there was no separate showing of hours, 
rate, or community standard. 
Glen M. Kichman, Salt Lake fiU, In 
appellant. 
J. Bruce Reading, Michael W. Spence, 
Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Kathryn Newmeyer brought 
this divorce action against her husband, 
Jeddy Newmeyer. The trial court granted 
Kathryn custody of the couple's minor 
child and awarded her the bulk of the prop-
erty, one dollar per year as alimony, and 
attorney fees. Jeddy appeals. He con-
tends that the property division was incor-
rect, that Kathryn should not have been 
awarded any alimony, and that the evi-
dence is insufficient to support an award of 
attorney fees. We agree only with the 
third contention and vacate the award of 
attorney fees. The judgment is otherwise 
affirmed. 
The Newmeyers were married just over 
twenty years. During that period, they 
owned three homes in succession. During 
the holding periods, each appreciated. The 
trial court awarded Jeddy an automobile, 
all rights to his pension plan, miscellaneous 
household items, his savings of approxi-
mately $7,000, and an equitable lien against 
the couple's current home in the amount of 
$32,606. The court awarded Kathryn the 
balance of the equity in the home, valued in 
excess of $80,000, two automobiles, miscel-
laneous household items, her savings of 
approximately $17,000, one dollar per year 
alimony, and $1,423 in attorney fees. Ka-
v. NEWMEYER Utah 1277 
1276 (Utah 1987) 
thryn also was allowed to take an income 
tax deduction for the couple's minor child 
for the tax year 1982. Jeddy was required 
to pay $200 per month child support and 
was awarded the tax deduction for the 
minor child for all the years following 1982. 
Jeddy challenges numerous aspects of 
the property division. However, he concen-
trates his attention on the division of the 
equity in the home. He challenges the 
findings on the relative contribution of 
each party and the current value of the 
home. Regarding the first of these issues 
—the contribution of each party—he con-
tends that the trial court erred in finding 
that Kathryn should receive credit for sub-
stantial amounts she received from inheri-
tances that were invested in the homes 
early in the marriage 
In dividing the marital estate, the trial 
court may make such orders concerning 
property distribution and alimony as are 
equitable. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) 
(1984 & Supp.1987). In making such or-
ders, the trial court is permitted broad lati-
tude, and its judgment is not to be lightly 
disturbed, so long as it exercises its discre-
tion in accordance with the standards set 
by this Court. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985); see Pusey v. Pu-
sey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986). It is 
therefore incumbent on the appealing party 
to prove that the trial court's division vio-
lates those standards, seef e.g., Jones, 700 
P.2d at 1074, or that the trial court's factu-
al findings upon which the division is 
grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
I I, 2) Jeddy concedes that Kathryn put 
money from her inheritances into the 
homes. However, he argues that because 
the inheritances received by Kathryn came 
into the marriage many years ago and 
were committed to the common venture of 
purchasing a home, the trial court was 
bound to divide this contribution equally 
between both parties. There is nothing in 
our cases that mandates such a result. 
The appropriate treatment of property 
brought into a marriage by one party may 
vary from case to case. Compare Work-
man v. Workman (>52 P 2d 931, 933 (Utah 
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1982) (husband's property acquired prior to 
marriage properly a part of marital assets 
to be divided upon divorce), and Jackson v. 
Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980) 
(title to marital property prior to divorce 
not binding on trial court's distribution), 
with Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 
(Utah 1982) (inheritance acquired during 
marriage properly excluded from valuation 
of marital assets), and Jesperson v. Jesper-
son, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (not 
unreasonable for trial court to withdraw 
from marital property the equivalent of 
assets brought into marriage). The over-
riding consideration is that the ultimate 
division be equitable—that property be fair-
ly divided between the parties, given their 
contributions during the marriage and their 
circumstances at the time of the divorce. 
See Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 
1986). 
In the present case, the circumstances 
warrant the treatment given the inheritanc-
es by the trial court. Under any version of 
the facts, it is readily apparent that Ka-
thryn paid the lion's share of the cost of 
the homes from money she received 
through inheritances. Moreover, the trial 
court was more than fair to Jeddy by cred-
iting him with an equal share in the appre-
ciation of the value of the homes despite 
his much lower contribution. Therefore, 
we conclude that the trial court exercised 
its discretion within the bounds set by our 
cases when it credited Kathryn with the 
inheritances she put into the homes. 
[3] Jeddy also disputes the trial court's 
factual determination of the amount each 
party contributed toward the purchase of 
the homes. There was conflicting evidence 
on this point at trial. Evidence fixed Ka-
thryn's probable contribution at $55,000 to 
$60,000 and Jeddy's at $7,000 to $12,000. 
Jeddy's present challenge to the trial 
court's factual findings as to the relative 
contributions of the parties amounts to 
nothing more than an attempt to retry the 
matter on appeal. There was evidence sup-
porting the positions of both parties. It 
was for the trial court to resolve the con-
flicts. We will not overturn such a factual 
resolution unless the appellant first mar-
shals all the evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding and then demonstrates that 
that evidence, when compared to the con-
trary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant 
the conclusion that clear error has been 
committed. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); see Har-
line v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 
1986); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). In the present 
case, Jeddy has not begun to meet this 
burden. Therefore, we reject his attack on 
the trial court's determination of the rela-
tive contributions of the parties. 
Jeddy next attacks the trial court's find-
ings as to the market value of the current 
home. Jeddy's expert witness testified 
that the house was worth $122,000, while 
Kathryn's testified that the value of the 
house was $112,000. The trial judge fixed 
the value of the house at $117,000. Based 
upon that finding, the appreciation in the 
value of the couple's successive homes was 
approximately $50,000. Jeddy argues that 
in fixing the value at $117,000, the court 
improperly "split" the difference between 
the values fixed by the experts. He argues 
that his expert should have been believed. 
[4] This argument, like the one that 
preceded it, is nothing but an attempt to 
have this Court substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court on a contested factu-
al issue. This we cannot do under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). In apparent 
recognition of this proposition, Jeddy 
masks this claim as a legal argument by 
contending that the trial judge acted im-
properly in splitting the difference between 
the experts. That argument is, of course, 
utterly lacking in merit. It is elementary 
that a judge is not bound to believe one 
witness's testimony to the total exclusion 
of that of another witness. When acting 
as the trier of fact, the trial judge is enti-
tled to give conflicting opinions whatever 
weight he or she deems appropriate. See 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 
(Utah 1983); see also Goodmundson v. 
Goodmundson, 201 Mont 535, 655 P.2d 
509, 511 (1982) (in adopting proposed val-
ues for marital assets, trial court may aver-
age conflicting values given by experts to 
arrive at an equitable solution). Therefore, 
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we hold that the district rourt did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that the 
value of the home was $117,000. 
[5J Jeddy next argues that the trial 
court improperly credited Kathryn with the 
1982 tax deduction for the minor child be-
cause under the prayer for relief contained 
in her initial complaint in this action, she 
asked that Jeddy be allowed that deduction. 
Kathryn did not amend her complaint to 
change the prayer for relief; therefore, 
Jeddy argues, the trial court lacked the 
authority to award her the 1982 tax deduc-
tion. Whatever the state of the pleadings, 
the record indicates that at trial, the en-
titlement to the 1982 tax deduction became 
a matter of dispute between the parties and 
was adjudicated without objection. Under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), a trial 
court is permitted to decide issues that are 
not raised by the pleadings when (i) they 
are tried by the parties and (ii) the failure 
to amend the initial pleadings to conform to 
the evidence in no way impairs the trial 
court's ability to resolve such an issue. 
Both of these requirements were mei. V/c 
therefore conclude that it was proper for 
the tnal judpe to consider the issue 
[6] Jeddy's other contentions regarding 
the trial court's property distribution lack 
merit.1 
[7, 8] Jeddy next contends that the trial 
court abused its discretion by awarding 
plaintiff one dollar per year alimony. Ali-
mony is to be awarded after considering 
three factors: the receiving spouse's finan-
cial condition and needs; the receiving 
spouse's ability to earn an adequate in-
come; and the providing spouse's ability to 
provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
at 1075. The record indicates that Kathryn 
received the majority of the assets of the 
marriage. However, she appears to have a 
relatively poor ability to earn an income 
sufficient to maintain as nearly as possible 
1. !l is worth noting thai in attacking the piop<i 
ty distribution, Jeddy fails entirely to take ac-
count of the fact that Kathryn received an ali-
mony award of only one dollar per year. In 
determining whether a certain division of prop-
erty is equitable, neither the trial court nor this 
Court considers the property division in a vac 
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the sUndard of living that the parties en 
joyed when married. Although working at 
the time of the divorce, during the course 
t t her two decades of marriage to Jeddy, 
Kathryn was employed only episodically, 
for brief periods, and at low-paying jobs. 
She did not have the opportunity to build 
up a retirement fund. Yet the trial court 
did not give her any interest in Jeddy's 
pension. Finally, the evidence suggests 
that Jeddy has better future income pros-
pects than Kathryn, In light of these cir-
cumstances, however, Kathryn only re-
ceived an alimony award of one dollar per 
year, presumably to preserve her right to 
seek an increase should there be a material 
change in circumsUnces in the future. 
Given these facts, Jeddy's claim that the 
trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
any alimony is utterly without merit. See, 
e.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 728 P 2d 991, 
992-93 (UUh 1986). 
[9] Jeddy's final contention is that the 
trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
Kathryn $1,423 in attorney fees. An 
award of attorney fees in divorce ?a.se? 
4
 must be supported by evidence that it is 
reasonable in amount and reasonably need-
ed by the party requesting the award." 
Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d at 419 (citing Beats 
v. Beats, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984)). Be-
cause ample evidence of Kathryn's finan-
cial condition was before the court, we re-
ject Jeddy's argument that the trial court's 
finding of need was unsupported by the 
evidence. On the other hand, it is incum-
bent on the party requesting attorney fees 
to demonstrate "the necessity of the num-
ber of hours dedicated, the reasonableness 
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty 
oi the case and the result accomplished, 
and the rates commonly charged for di-
vorce actions in the community/' Beals, 
682 P.2d at 864 (quoting Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980)); accord 
Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 
inn I he amount of alimony awarded and the 
relative earning capabilities of the parties are 
also relevant, because the relative abilities of the 
spouses to support themselves after the divorce 
are pertinent to an equitable determination of 
the division of the fixed assets of the marriage. 
1280 U t a n 7 4 5 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
1984). Kathryn failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the fees were 
reasonable. The evidence regarding attor-
ney fees consisted solely of Kathryn's testi-
mony. There was no separate showing of 
the hours, rate, or community standard. 
Because Kathryn failed to carry her bur-
den and establish the proper evidentiary 
basis for the award, we hold that it was an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
award her $1,423 in attorney fees. 
The divorce decree is affirmed, but the 
award of attorney fees to plaintiff is strick-
en. Costs to respondent. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, 
Associate C.J., concur. 
HOWE, Justice: (concurring). 
I concur. This case presents a recurring 
issue before this Court, viz., the division of 
property inherited or received by gift by 
one spouse from his or her family either 
before or during marriage. No rules to 
guide the trial court have been expressed 
by the legislature or by this Court over the 
past years except the illusory standard that 
the ultimate division should be fair and 
equitable. While I recognize that trial 
judges must have flexibility and discretion 
in dividing property, I believe that such 
inherited or donated property should be 
dealt with more consistently and according 
to more definite and meaningful guidelines. 
Typical of our expressions dealing with in-
herited property is the following language 
found in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987) (a case in which I concurred), 
where we said: 
[I]n appropriate circumstances equity re-
quires that each party recover the sepa-
rate property brought into or received 
during the marriage. 
However, no mention was made of what 
comprise "appropriate circumstances/' 
From my review of the cases decided by 
this Court in recent years, many of which 
are cited in the instant case and in the 
footnotes to Burke v. Burke, supra, no 
discernible pattern of treating inherited or 
donated property is apparent. For in-
stance, in Burke, Mrs. Burke, ten years 
into the marriage, inherited from her moth-
er's estate three and one-half acres of 
unimproved land, then worth less than 
$5,000. Without any improvements being 
made to the property or any effort expend-
ed by either party, the property appreciat-
ed at the time of divorce to $35,000 per 
acre. The trial court awarded the property 
solely to Mrs. Burke, giving Mr. Burke no 
part of the original value ($5,000) or its 
appreciation during the marriage ($117,-
500). This Court refused to disturb that 
award. 
Similarly, in Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 
705, 706 (Utah 1982), we affirmed a divorce 
decree awarding to each party in general 
the real and personal property he or she 
brought to the marriage or inherited dur-
ing the marriage. We there said: 
Following the principle we have approved 
in cases like Georgedes v. Georgedes, 
Utah, 627 P.2d 44 (1981); Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 (1980); 
and Humphreys v. Humphreys, Utah, 
52U P.2d 193 (1974), the district cuujt 
concluded that each party should, in gen-
eral, receive the real and personal prop-
erty he or she brought to the marriage or 
inherited during the marriage. 
Without any mention or recognition of 
the principle referred to in the above quota-
tion, we have in other cases approved a 
division among the parties of property in-
herited or donated to one party prior to or 
during the marriage. Argyle v. Argyle, 
688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984); Bushell v. Bu-
shell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982); Dubois v. 
Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 
(1973); Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 
442 P.2d 928 (1968). No case has been 
found where we have reversed a trial 
court's disposition of such property. 
A middle approach was taken in the in-
stant case. Mr. Newmeyer was awarded 
no part of his wife's inheritance, but he 
was allowed to share equally in the appreci-
ation of the properties in which her inheri-
tance was invested. Yet I am unable to 
discern why it was "fair and equitable" to 
deny to Mr. Burke that which was given to 
Mr. Newmeyer. 
SALT LAKE CITY v TUERO 
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own unique set of circumstances, I am con-
cerned with the lack of consistency in treat 
mg inherited and donated property \\ th 
out more definite rules, each party takes 
his or her chances that the particular trial 
judge assigned to hear the case on that 
given day will perceive it to be fair and 
equitable to divide or not to divide such 
property I believe that some general 
rules should at least be articulated and 
followed 
The Court's opinion in Burke v Burke, 
supra, repeated the factors which we enun-
ciated in Pinion v Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 
P2d 265 (1937), that are generally to be 
considered in making property divisions 
No guidance, however, was given as to 
when it would be appropriate to divide in-
herited or donated property We would be 
doing a service to the Bar and to the trial 
bench to be more definite m our treatment 
of such property It is no wonder that so 
many cases involving such propert) haw 
been appealed, since the "losing" party in 
comparing his or her case with other cases 
decided b> tins Court can discern no ration-
al basis for the disparate treatment he or 
she has received 
Legislative guidance would be helptul on 
this question Utah Code Ann § 30-2-1 
expresses a legislative intent that property 
of a manned woman acquired by gift or 
inheritance should remain her estate and 
property To what extent should that rule 
be modified when a divorce occurs? See 
Izatt ? Izait f>27 P ?d 19 (Utah 1981) 
DURHAM, Justice (toncuimiK AIHI 
dissenting). 
1 concur in the majority opinion except 
for its vacation of the award of attorney 
fees. The standard of reasonableness set 
forth by the majority is entirely correct 
but in view of the pleadings, discovery, 
pretrial appearances, full day's trial, and 
number and complexity of the issues, all of 
which are patent on the face of the record 
(and therefore obvious also to the tnal 
judge), I think that the tnal courl had 
sufficient information to assess reasonable-
ness. Plaintiff established that the fees 
tht amount itselt 
proves that counsel devoted approximately 
17 to 18 hours at $80 per hour, or approxi-
mately 14 to 15 hours at $100 per hour, or 
even 28 to 29 hours at $50 per hour Keep-
ing in mind that the trial itself took a full 
day and that there was a pretrial heanng 
on support and at least one deposition tak-
en by defendant's counsel, I have no diffi-
culty taking judicial notice that the fee of 
$1,423 was reasonable In view of plain-
tiff's need, I think it inappropriate to deny 
her the assistance ordered h\ the trial 
court 
: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 3> 
John 
SALT LAKE CITY Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
1UERO, Defendant unti ^[ipdiant. 
No ^TOOIMH 
LoUit >f Vppeals of btah 
No\ 20, 1987 
Defendant was convicted of dnving un-
der the influence by the Fifth Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake County, Sheila K 
McCleve, by jury verdict. Defendant ap-
pealed The Court of Appeals, Davidson, 
J , held that (1) the tnal court did not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to dismiss 
for cause potential juror, who stated that 
his wife had been "broadsided b) a drunk 
dnver," and (2) the tnal court was not 
required to question potential jurors on 
whether they believed penalties involved 
were too harsh >r too lenient 
Affirmed. 
1 Jur ) <*->105U>t 
The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion, m prosecution for dnving under the 
influence, by refusing to dismiss for cause 
APPENDIX 6 
26 §151 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 194 
1986 Amendments. Subsec (c). Pub L ^ 9 -
514. vj 103(b), redesignated former subsec. (e) as 
(c) and struck out prior subsec (c) provision for 
an additional exemption for taxpayer or spouse 
aged 65 or more. 
Pub L ^(>-514. § l.K47<b)<3). substituted "sec-
tion 22(e)" for "section 37(e)" in par. (a)(5) 
Subsec (d) Pub L 9M-5I4, $ 103(b). redesig-
nated as subsec (d) former subsec (f). as amended 
by Pub.L. 99-514. $ 103(a), and struck out prior 
subsec (d) provision for an additional exemption 
for blindness of taxpayer or spouse. 
Subsec. (e). Pub.L. 99-514. § 103(b). redesig-
nated former subsec. (e) a.s (c) 
Subsec. (f). Pub.L 99-514. § 103(a) added 
subsec (0 "exemption amount" provision and 
struck out prior "exemption amount" provision 
reading: "Fo r purposes of this section, the term 
'exemption amount ' means, with respect to any 
taxable year. $1,000 increased b> an amount equal 
to SI.(XX) multiplied bv the cost-of-living adjust-
ment (as defined in section 1(f)(3)) for the calen-
dar year in which the taxable year begins. If the 
amount determined under the preceding sentence 
is not a multiple of $10, such amount shall be 
rounded to the nearest multiple of S10 (or if such 
amount is a multiple of $5, such amount shall be 
increased to the next highest multiple of S10)."; 
the "exemption amount" provision redesignated 
by Pub.L. 99-514. § 103(b), as subsec (d). 
1984 Amendment. Subsec. (e)(5) Pub L 9 8 -
3h9 added par. P ) 
1981 Amendment. Subsecs. (b), (c). (dM»). (2), 
(eWl). Pub.L. 97-34. § KH(cKI). substituted 
" the exemption amount" for "SI,(XX)" wherever 
appearing 
Subsec. (0. Pub L 97-34. § 104(c)(2). added 
subsec (f). 
Kffective Date of 19K6 Amendment. Amend-
ment of this section bs section 103 of Pub I 
99-514 applicable to taxable vears beginning after 
Dec. 31. 1986. see section 151(a) of Pub.L 99 
514. set out as a note under section 1 of this title. 
\mendmen t bv sections lhOl to 1H80 of Pub.L 
9^-514 effective as if included in the provisions of 
the Tax Reform Act of 19*4, Pub.L. 98-369. 
except as otherwise provided, see section 1881 of 
Pub.L 99-514. set out as .» note under section 48 
of this title 
Kffective Date of 1984 Amendment. Section 
426(b) of P u b L 98-369 provided that: "The 
amendment made by subsection (a) [enacting sub-
sec (e)(5) of this section) shall apply to taxable 
years beginning after December 31. 1984." 
Lffective Date of 1981 Amendment. Amend-
ment by section 104 of Pub L ^7-34 applicable to 
taxable years beginning after Dec. 31. 1984, see 
section 104(e) of Pub.I 97-34. set out as a note 
under section I of this title 
Legislative History. For legislative history and 
purpose of Pub.l 98-369. see 1984 U.S.Code 
Cong and Adm News, p 697. See. also, P u b L 
99-514. 1986 L'.S.GxJe Cong, and Adm.News, p 
4075. 
I,aw Review Commentaries 
Domestic relations tax reform. 
L Rev. 251 (1984/85). 
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Notes of Decisions 
2. Generally 
No exemption or deduction existed for cost of 
providing taxpayer's family with the "American 
Standard of good living." Crimes v. C.I.R., C.A. 
9. 1986. 806 F.Zd 1451. 
§ 152. Dependent defined 
(a) General definition.—For purposes of this subtitle, the term "dependent" 
means any of the following individuals over half of whose support, for the calendar 
year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from the 
taxpayer (or is treated under subsection (c) or (e) as received from the taxpayer): 
(1) A son or daughter of the taxpayer, or a descendant of either, 
(2) A stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer, 
(3) A brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer, 
(4) The father or mother of the taxpayer, or an ancestor of either, 
(5) A stepfather or stepmother of the taxpayer, 
(6) A son or daughter of a brother or sister of the taxpayer, 
(7) A brother or sister of the father or mother of the taxpayer, 
(8) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, 
or sister-in-law of the taxpayer, or 
(9) An individual (other than an individual who at any time during the taxable 
year was the spouse, determined without regard to section 7703, of the taxpay-
er) who, for the taxable year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode 
the home of the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household. 
(b) Rules relating to general definition.—For purposes of this section— 
(1) The terms "brother" and "sister" include a brother or sister by the 
halfblood. 
(2) In determining whether any of the relationships specified in subsection (a) 
or paragraph (1) of this subsection exists, a legally adopted child of an individual 
(and a child who is a member of an individual's household, if placed with such 
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individual by an authorized placement agency for legal adoption by such 
individual), or a foster child of an individual (if such child satisfies the require-
ments of subsection (a)(9) with respect to such individual), shall be treated as a 
child of such individual by blood. 
(3) The term "dependent" does not include any individual who is not a citizen 
or national of the United States unless such individual is a resident of the United 
States or of a country contiguous to the United Suites. The preceding sentence 
shall not exclude from the definition of "dependent" any child of the taxpayer 
legally adopted by him, if, for the taxable year of the taxpayer, the child has as 
his principal place of abode the home of the taxpayer and is a meml>er of the 
taxpayer's household, and if the taxpayer is a citizen or national of the United 
States. 
(4) A payment to a wife which is includible in the gross income of the wife 
under section 71 or 682 shall not be treated as a payment by her husband for the 
support of any dependent. 
(5) An individual is not a member of the taxpayer's household .f at any un-
during the taxable year of the taxpayer the relationship ht»twe<-n vaeh md;\ !<!-•. • 
and the taxpayer is in violation of local law. 
(c) Multiple support agreements.—For purposes of subsection (a), over half of 
the support of an individual for a calendar year shall be treated as received from the 
taxpayer if— 
(1) no one person contributed over half of such support; 
(2) over half of such support was received from persons each of whom, but 
for the fact that he did not contribute over half of such support, would have 
been entitled to claim such individual as a dependent for a taxable year 
beginning in such calendar year; 
(3) the taxpayer contributed over 10 percent of such support; and 
(4) each person described in paragraph (2) (other than the taxpayer) who 
contributed over 10 percent of such support files a written declaration (in such 
manner and form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that he will not 
claim such individual as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such 
calendar year 
(d) Special support test in case of • ;ti n lei its.—ror purposes oi subsection {&>, in 
the case of any individual who is— 
( D a son, stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer (within the 
meaning of this section), and 
(2) a student (within the meaning of section 151(cM4n, 
amounts received as scholarships for study at an educational organization described 
in section 170(b)(l)(A)(ii) shall not be taken into account in determining whether such 
individual received more than half of his support from the taxpayer. 
(e) Supporl -J • diwircrd parents, etc.— 
(1) Custodial pa-« *->-: • - '.^ -<*n -Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, if— 
(A) a child (as defined in section 151(c)(3)) receives over half of his 
support during the calendar year from his parents— 
(i) who are divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce or 
separate maintenance, 
Hi) who are separated under a written separation agreement, or 
(iii) who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the 
calendar year, and 
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of his parents for more 
than one-half of the calendar year, 
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), as receiving over half 
of his support during the calendar year from the parent having custody for a 
greater portion of the calendar year (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as 
the "custodial parent"). 
(2) Exception where custodial parent release* claim to exemption for the 
year.—A child of parents described in paragraph (1> shall be treated as having 
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received over half of his support during a calendar.year from the noncustodial 
parent if -
(A) the custodial parent si^ns a written declaration (in such manner and 
form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such custodial 
parent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year 
beginning in such calendar year, and 
(B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the 
noncustodial parent's return for the taxable year beginning during such 
calendar year. 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "noncustodial parent" means the 
parent who is not the custodial parent. 
(3) Exception for multiple-support agreement.—This subsection shall not 
apply in any case where over half of the support of the child is treated as having 
been received from a taxpayer under the provisions of subsection (c). 
(•I) Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments.— 
(A) In K**neral.—\ child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall r>e 
treated as having received over half his support during a calendar year 
from the noncustodial parent if— 
(i) a qualified pre-19Hf> instrument between the parents applicable to 
the taxable year beginning in such calendar year provides that the 
noncustodial parent shall be entitled to any deduction allowable under 
section 151 for such child, and 
(ii) the noncustodial parent provides at least $t>00 for the support of 
such child during such calendar year. 
For purposes of this subparagraph, amounts expended for the support of a 
child or children shad be treated as received from the noncustodial parent to 
the extent that such parent provided amounts for such support. 
(B) Qualified pre-1985 instrument.—For purposes of this paragraph, the 
term "qualified pre-li)8f> instrument" means any decree of divorce or 
separate maintenance or written agreement— 
(i) which is executed before January 1, H*S;">. 
(ii) which on such date contains the provision described in subpara-
graph (A){i), and 
(iii) which is not modified on or after such 'late in a modification 
which expressly provides that this paragraph shall not apply to such 
decree or agreement. 
(5) Special rule for support received from new spouse of parent.—For 
purposes of this subsection, in the case of the remarriage of a parent, support of 
a child received from the patent's spouse shall be treated as received from the 
parent, 
(ft) (TOSS reference.— 
For provision treating child as dependent of both parents for 
purposes of medical expense deduction, see section 213(d)(4). 
(Aug. 16, 1954. c 736. 68A Stat. 43; Aug. 9, 19f>f>, c. 693, § 2. 69 Suit. 626; Sept. 2. 1958. Pub.L 
8.V866. Title I. § 4(aHc). 72 Slut. 1607; Sept. 23. 1959, Pub.L. 86-376. § 1(a), 73 Stat. 699; Aug. 
31, 1967, Pub.L 90-78. § 1. 81 Stat. 191; Dec. 30. 1969. Pub.L 91-172. Title IX. § 912(a). 83 Stat. 
722; Oct. 27. 1972. Pub L 92-580. § 1(a). 86 Stat. 1276; Oct. 4, 1976. Pub.L. 94-455. Title XIX. 
§§ 1901(aX24), (bM7MB>. (8MA). l906(bHl3KA), Title XXI. § 2139(a). 90 Stat. 1767. 1794. 1834. 1932; 
July 18. 1984. Pub.L 98-369, Title IV, §§ 423(a), 482(b)(2). 98 Stat. 799. 848; Oct. 22. 1986. Pub.L. 
99-514. Title I. § 104(b)(1)(B). (3). Title XIII. § 1301(j)(8). KM) Stat. 2104, 2105, 2658.) 
1986 Amendment. Subsec. (aM9) Pub.L 99-
514. § 1301(JX8), substituted reference to section 
"7703" for "143" 
Subsec. (d)(2) PubL 99-5)4. § 104(b)(3). 
substituted "section !51(c)W for "section 
15l<eH4r. 
Subsec. (eMIXA). Pub.L 99-514. 
§ !04<bKlKB). substituted reference to "section 
15I(CX3)" for "section l5l(eX3)" 
1984 Amendment. Subsec. (e). I'ub.L 9«_3r>9, 
§ 423(a). in substantially revising support tot 
provisions, enacted par. (1) custodial parent ex-
emption, former par (I) declaring the general rule 
that where a child received over one-half of his 
calendar year support from parents who were 
divorced or legally separated under a decree of 
divorce or separate maintenance, or were separat-
ed under a written separation agreement, and the 
child was in the custody of one or both parents for 
more than one-half of the calendar year, the child 
would be treated as receiving over half of his 
support from the parent having custody for a 
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DIVORCE 30-3-5 
30-3-4-4. Jurisdiction of commissioner — Referral of cases 
to court. 
(1) All domestic relations matters, including orders to show cause, pretrial 
conferences, petitions for modification of a divorce decree, scheduling confer-
ences, and all other applications for relief, except ex parte motions, shall be 
referred to the court commissioner before any hearing may be scheduled be-
fore the district court judge, unless otherwise ordered. 
(2) The court commissioner shall, after hearing any motion or other appli-
cation for relief, recommend entry of an order, and shall make a written 
recommendation as to each matter heard. Should the parties not consent to 
the recommended order, the matter shall be referred for further disposition by 
a district judge. 
(3) Any party objecting to the recommended order or seeking further hear-
ing before a district judge shall, within ten days of the entry of the commis-
sioner's recommendations, provide notice to the commissioner's office and op-
posing counsel that the recommended order is not acceptable or that further 
hearing is desired. The commissioner shall then refer the matter to a district 
judge for further hearing, conference, or trial. If no objection or request for 
further hearing is made within ten days, the party is deemed to have con-
sented to entry of an order in conformance with the commissioner's recom-
mendation. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-4.4, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 151, § 5. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction - Custody *nd visitation — 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and 
(b> if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
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children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental can\ or the dis-
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and oilier 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
<rood faith. 
History: R.S. 1898 & l \L, 1907, & 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, $ 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1985 amendment 
by Chapter 7? *-oHT~»c Subjection i l i which 
formerly read as set out as the first three sen-
tences of subsection (1> in the parent volume; 
added Subsection (2); designated two undesig-
nated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4); 
inserted "In determining" and "the court" in 
Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsec-
tions (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); di-
vided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substi-
tuting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless 
that marriage"; substituted "payment of for 
"in which case" in Subsection (5); substituted 
"terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony" for "shall be terminated upon 
application of that party establishing" in Sub-
section (6); divided Subsection (6) into two sen-
tences, substituting "However, if* for "unless"; 
deleted "between them" after "association" in 
Subsection (6); added "payment of alimony 
shall resume" in Subsection (6); and made 
minor rhanfroe jy; phraseology. 
The 1985 amendment by Chapter 100 re-
wrote Subsection (1) which formerly read as set 
out as the first three sentences of Subsection 
(1) in the parent volume; designated two un-
designated paragraphs as Subsections (2) and 
(3); made identical changes in Subsections (2) 
and (3) as those made to Subsections (3) and (4) 
by Laws 1.985, Chapter 72; redesignated for-
mer Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (4) 
and (5); made identical changes in Subsections 
(4) and (5) as those made to Subsections (5) and 
(6) by Laws 1985, Chapter 72; added Subsec-
tion (6); and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy. 
ANALYSIS 
Alimony. 
—Amount. 
—Modification. 
—Termination. 
Bankruptcy. 
—Effect upon divorce decree. 
Children. 
—Custody. 
Modification. 
—Support. 
Failure to pay. 
- —Modification. 
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